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The Illinois Mental Health and Developmental
Disabilities Confidentiality Act: Lest We Forget the
Search for the Truth
ElinorLynn Hart*
Mentored by Judge Diane Larsen**
"But it will hardly be said, that a man's sufferings will be greater, at
seeing evidence to his prejudice extracted from another bosom, than at
feeling it extracted from his own."
1
- Jeremy Bentham
I. INTRODUCTION

The Illinois legislature promulgated the Mental
Act
Confidentiality
Disabilities
Developmental

Health and
(hereinafter

"MHDDCA") 2 for the primary purpose of restricting the disclosure of

all mental health records and communications, 3 and in an effort to
* Loyola University Chicago School of Law, J.D. expected 2011. My sincerest thanks to
Judge Diane Larsen for her mentorship-this Article came to fruition in derivation of her
wisdom. I would also like to thank the dedicated members of the Loyola Law Journalfor their
brilliant criticisms, without which this Article would not be complete. Finally, I thank my
wonderful family and my loving Jozef for their unyielding support in this and every other
endeavor.
** Judge Diane Larsen has been a Law Division Judge in Cook County for the past twelve
years and has served as an adjunct professor at Loyola University Chicago School of Law for the
past nineteen years. Prior to her entrance on the bench, Judge Larsen was the Chief of Policy
Litigation for the City of Chicago Law Department.
1. 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 301 (John Stuart Mill ed., 1827)
[hereinafter RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE]. Congruent with eighteenth and nineteenth

century British philosopher Jeremy Bentham's above belief on the value of privileges, Bentham
believed that the "first and foremost objective of the judicial system was to accurately ascertain
the truth." EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 2.5, at 113 (2002) [hereinafter THE NEW WIGMORE]. Accordingly,
Bentham was "generally opposed to exclusionary rules of evidence," id., and believed that most
evidentiary privileges were "rubbish," id. at 115.
2. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110 (2008).

3. 22 ILL. PRACTICE SERIES, THE LAW OF MEDICAL PRACTICE IN ILLINOIS § 28.8, at 1 (3d ed.
2008) [hereinafter ILLINOIS PRACTICE SERIES - MHDDCA § 28.8]. Illinois has additional
statutes that create evidentiary privileges in other therapeutic situations, including 735 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/8-802.1 (2008) (establishing confidentiality of statements made to rape crisis personnel)
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streamline the confidentiality protections afforded to recipients of
mental health and developmental disabilities services. 4 Though the
MHDDCA applies both to records of persons with developmental
disabilities and persons with mental illnesses, this Comment only
addresses the MHDDCA's application to the latter.
The appropriate application of an evidentiary privilege is particularly
important because privileges are in derogation of the truth. 5 As a result,
privileges are not to be construed expansively; 6 and because it is the
court's function to interpret such privileges, 7 they must be sure to do so
in the most restrictive manner. 8 As this Comment will discuss,
however, Illinois courts have broadly applied the privilege codified by
the MHDDCA through an expansive construction of section 10(a)(1)'s
language, which pertains9 to disclosure in civil, criminal, or
administrative proceedings.
In so doing, Illinois courts have interpreted section 10(a)(1) to require
a strenuous standard of admissibility, an "at issue" standard versus the
plain language "introduction" standard. As a result, the courts have
and 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-802 (2008) (establishing the privilege over communications
between a physician and patient).
4. Reda v. Advocate Health Care, 765 N.E.2d 1002, 1010 (111. 2002) (noting that "the
[MHDDCA] represents a comprehensive revision and repeal of previous statutes pertaining to
psychotherapeutic communications"); Ill. Gen. Assemb., 80th Sess. Deb., at 63 (June 27, 1978),
available at http://www.ilga.gov/house/transcripts/htrans80/HT062778.pdf [hereinafter 80th Sess.
Deb.] (statement of Rep. Richard Mugalian) (noting that "Senate Bill 255 [the Bill promulgating
the MHDDCA] has attempted to consolidate the standards pertinent to confidentiality into one
comprehensive law"); see also infra notes 90, 94, and 100 and accompanying text (discussing
definitions of "recipient" and "services" under section 10(a)(l) and legislative history of the
streamlining function of the MHDDCA).
5. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 19 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974)) ("Testimonial privileges, [this Court] has said, 'are not lightly
created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth."').
6. Id.
7. The courts must interpret and apply statutes according to the doctrines of statutory
construction, wherein "the principle concern is how appellate judges decide and justify their
decisions in cases in which a statute may be applicable." Robert J. Martineau, Craft and
Technique, not Canons and Grand Theories: A Neo-Realist View of Statutory Construction, 62
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 5 (1993); see also infra Part V.B (discussing the established doctrines of
statutory construction).
8. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 19 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554,
568-70 (1989)) (stating that the scope of existing privileges is to be construed narrowly).
Privileges are to be "strictly construed." Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 432 N.E.2d
250, 257 (i1. 1982) (citation omitted); People v. Eveans, 660 N.E.2d 240, 246 (il. App. Ct.
1996); FMC Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 603 N.E.2d 716, 718 (il. App. Ct. 1992); see also
infra Part V.B (discussing rules of statutory construction as they pertain to the proposal to return
to the plain language of the MHDDCA).
9. See infra Parts III.B, IV.A.3 (discussing the Illinois courts' interpretations of the MHDDCA
and section 10(a)(1)).
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prohibited the discovery of mental health records in situations in which
the statute appears to allow disclosure. 10
Moreover, significant

litigation has resulted from the need to interpret section 10(a)(1),
particularly as the courts seek to balance competing interests: the
court's truth-seeking function and the inhibitive nature of evidentiary
privileges. 1 1 Accordingly, it is increasingly necessary to determine the
proper scope of section 10(a)(1), particularly in light of the United
States Supreme Court's recognition that a cognizable distinction exists
between "at issue" and "introduction" standards of admissibility. 12
In order to put into context the Illinois courts' interpretations of
section 10(a)(1), a general background of privileges is necessary. Thus,
Part II of this Comment will provide a broad discussion of privileges, as
well as their function in the medical context. 13 Then, Part 1H will
explain privileges in the mental health context. 14 Next, Part III
discusses the history of the MHDDCA and the judicially created
"fundamental fairness" doctrine of admissibility. 15 It then describes the
Illinois precedent for the interpretation and application of section

10(a)(1), starting with an analysis of the "at issue"

standard

10. See infra Part IV.A.3 (showing the effect that the "introduction" standard may have had on
cases previously using the "at issue" standard).
11. See infra Part fl.B (discussing Illinois courts' application of the MHDDCA and section
10(a)(1)).
12. Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 54 (2001). In Shafer, this distinction between "at
issue" and "introduction" was highly dispositive to the issue before the court. Id. The issue in
Shafer was in part whether the criminal defendant's "future dangerousness" had been put at issue.
Id. at 39. Defendant Shafer was convicted of murder, attempted armed robbery, and criminal
conspiracy for which the prosecutor sought the death penalty. Id. at 40. In an effort to avoid the
death penalty, Shafer sought a jury instruction under Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154
(1994), notifying the jury that a sentence of life imprisonment would not render him eligible for
parole. Shafer, 532 U.S. at 41. Such an instruction, however, only applied if, in part, Shafer's
"future dangerousness" was at issue. Id. at 39. Thus, one of the issues on appeal was whether
Shafer should have received the instruction on the basis that his future dangerousness had been
put at issue. Id. at 40-41. The Court noted that the prosecutor and defense counsel argued in the
trial court about the definition of "at issue." Id. at 54. Specifically, the question was whether the
defendant's future dangerousness was sufficiently put at issue by the prosecution's introduction
of evidence of past crimes, or whether the prosecuting attorney had to affirmatively argue that the
defendant's future dangerousness was at issue. Id. In recognizing that there was indeed a
cognizable distinction between introducing something and placing something directly "at issue,"
the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded back to the South Carolina Supreme
Court for a determination of the extent to which the prosecution had introduced or placed at issue
Shafer's propensity for future dangerousness. Id. at 54-55; see also United States v. First State
Bank, 691 F.2d 332, 335-36 (7th Cir. 1982) (defendant did not place element of privilege at issue
even though he introduced a claim of privilege).
13. See infra Parts fI.A-B (discussing privileges both historically and in the medical context).
14. See infra Part l.C (discussing the federally recognized psychotherapist-patient privilege).
15. See infra notes 120-32 and accompanying text (discussing the fundamental fairness
exception created by the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in D.C. v. S.A.).
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overwhelmingly applied by the courts and using the Illinois Supreme
Court's Norskog v. Pfiel16 decision as an illustration. 17 Finally, Part III
discusses the few cases that have appropriately applied the plain
language "introduction" standard, with particular emphasis on the
Illinois Supreme Court's Goldberg v. Davis18 decision. 19
Part IV will analyze the manner in which the Illinois courts have

interpreted section 10(a)(1), highlighting the distinctions between the

"at issue" and "introduction" standards. 20 By discussing the standards
of evidentiary admissibility and the application of the "at issue" and
"introduction" standards outside the context of the MHDDCA, Part IV
underscores the gaps in the Illinois courts' prevailing interpretations of

section 10(a)(1) and the perverse effect they have had on the judiciary's
truth-seeking function. 2 1 Finally, Part V of this Comment proposes that
the Illinois courts reassess the philosophical underpinnings of the
MHDDCA and the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 22 Specifically,
Illinois courts should follow statutory interpretation doctrines that
require enhanced emphasis on the plain language of section 10(a)(1)
23
and consideration of all the statute's provisions.
II. BACKGROUND
Evidentiary privileges bar the admission of certain evidence, and
under English and American jurisprudence, privileges have primarily
developed under modem common law. 2 4 Though privileges initially
16. 755
17. See
10(a)(1)).
18. 602
19. See

N.E.2d 1 (111. 2001).
infra Part III.B (discussing the Illinois courts' interpretation and application of section
N.E.2d 812 (Ill. 1992).
infra Part 11.B (discussing the Illinois courts' treatment of section 10(a)(1)).

20. See infra Parts IV.A.1-2 (discussing the "at issue" and "introduction" standards

independent of the MHDDCA).
21. See infra Part IV.A.3 (highlighting pertinent gaps in the Illinois courts' interpretation of
section 10(a)(1)).

22. See infra Part V.A (discussing criticisms of the psychotherapist-patient privilege and the
need to reassess the underpinnings of the MHDDCA).
23. See infra Parts V.B-D (creating an incremental proposal for a revised construction of
section 10(a)(l)).

24. THE NEw WIGMORE, supra note 1, at 92 ("Privileges are a relatively recent phenomenon
in the history of the common law."). The early common law of evidentiary privileges has its
roots in laws prohibiting persons believed to be "incompetent" from testifying at a trial. Id. The
"incompetency rules" in turn reduced the need for courts to assess and create evidentiary
privileges. Id. at 93. As the English jury system developed from information-producing jurors to
information-seeking jurors, however, the use of non-juror testimony increased, id. at 95-96, and
the courts began to examine the necessity for privileges "to enforce the legal system's right to
every man's evidence . . . [and] protect[] certain types of confidential communications and
information," id. at 100.
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only applied to several select relationships, 25 their scope has expanded
under the rationale that an increasing number of relationships and
interactions are so important that without a privilege, the particular
communication would be hampered, if not destroyed.2 6 Thus, to
understand the history of the MHDDCA, this Part will discuss
privileges generally and within the contexts of medicine and
27
psychotherapy as they apply in Illinois and federal courts.
A.

Privileges,Generally

In contrast to the majority of evidentiary rules seeking to promote the
truth-seeking process, 28 privileges are specifically designed to inhibit
the fact-finding process. 29 The rationale generally used to support
privileges is that they protect important social interests by trading
evidence for confidentiality 30 and encourage communications that,

25. Id. at 105 ("[Tihe early English common law recognized few privileges."); see also infra
Part II.A (providing a general history of evidentiary privileges).
26. THE NEW WIGMORE, supra note 1, at 105 (noting that privileges are created based on the
belief that "absent privileges, most laypersons would refrain from engaging in [these] desirable
activities"). In determining whether or not to create privileges, privilege theory dictates that the
courts must use a two-step process. Id. First, the court identifies socially useful relationships that
"in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered." Id. (footnote omitted).
Second, the court determines the extent to which the recognition of the privilege promotes the
particular relationship at issue, often working under the assumption that "the average layperson is
so fearful that the revelation will later come back to haunt him or her in litigation that he or she
would not make the revelation without the assurance of confidentiality furnished by an
evidentiary privilege." Id. at 105-06. Indeed, during the 1700s the courts began to recognize this
theory of privileges as the prevailing rationale for many existing privileges such as the attorneyclient or spousal privileges. See id. at 109-11 (noting that due to "concem[s] about the impact of
the legal rule on the stability of the relationship ... the new rationale posited a causal connection
between the existence of the privilege and client behavior").
27. See infra Parts H.A-C (discussing the historical context of privileges, the physicianpatient privilege in Illinois and under federal rules, and the federal recognition of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege).
28. THE NEW WIGMORE, supra note 1, at 91 ("[T]he legal system 'has a right to every man's
evidence."') (citation omitted).
29. 1 KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 72, at 339 (6th ed. 2006)
[hereinafter MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE]; see also Reda v. Advocate Health Care, 765 N.E.2d
1002, 1009 (I1. 2002) (citing Norskog v. Pfiel, 755 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2001)) (stating that privileges
"protect some outside interest other than the ascertainment of truth at trial"); D.C. v. S.A., 687
N.E.2d 1032, 1038 (Il. 1997) (noting that privileges "are not designed to promote the truth
seeking process, but rather to protect some outside interest other than the ascertainment of truth at
trial"); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES:
TEXTS, CASES AND PROBLEMS 759 (6th ed. 2008) [hereinafter EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES]
(noting that the purpose of a privilege "is to protect certain relationships and values, even if such
protection imposes significant costs on the litigation process. [Its] effect in any given trial may
be to impede the search for truth.").
30. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 29, at 339.
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without the privilege, would be difficult to facilitate. 3 1 Thus, by
creating a privilege, legislatures or the courts intend to strike a balance
between the judicial system's interest in assessing all relevant
information and the desire to encourage the particular confidential
32
relationship.
Historically, privileges were limited to confidential communications
between spouses, 33 attorney-client, 34 clergy-penitent, 3 5 and in the United
36
States, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
31. Id. at 339-40; see also Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996) ("[T]he mere possibility
of disclosure may impede development of the confidential relationship necessary for successful
treatment.") (footnote omitted).
32. Laurent v. Brelji, 392 N.E.2d 929, 931 (IIl. App. Ct. 1979) (citing In re Westland, 362
N.E.2d 1153, 1156 (111.App. Ct. 1977)) (noting that privileges are a balance "between the
encouragement and protection of confidential relationships and the interest of disclosure of
relevant information").
33. The spousal privilege is a privilege that has "received special legal protection" since early
common law. THE NEW WIGMORE, supra note 1, at 104; see also Trammel v. United States, 445
U.S. 40, 53 (1980) (upholding privilege of spousal confidences but with the modification that
"the witness-spouse alone has a privilege to refuse to testify adversely; the witness may be neither
compelled to testify nor foreclosed from testifying"). In its modem form, the privilege protects
two forms of spousal communication: adverse spousal testimony and spousal confidences.
EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES, supra note 29, at 819. The justification for the spousal privilege is
in part the desire to "foster the harmony and sanctity of the marriage relationship." Trammel, 445
U.S. at44.
34. The attorney-client privilege was the first evidentiary privilege to be recognized by
English law and it is believed to have "developed roughly contemporaneously with the right to
compulsory process." THE NEW WIGMORE, supra note 1, at 100. The attorney-client privilege
only extends so far as the evidence was communicated in the course of legal services offered by
the attorney and where the client had an expectation of confidentiality. EVIDENCE UNDER THE
RULES, supra note 29, at 765, 773.
35. Although there is some controversy regarding the existence of the clergy-penitent
privilege in old English law, literature suggests that the privilege at least existed at one point,
though it appears to have disappeared in relatively modern English common law. THE NEW
WIGMORE, supra note 1, at 465 n.193. Nonetheless, the privilege is now recognized by every
U.S. state as well as U.S. federal common law. Id. at 465. Interestingly, the clergy-penitent
privilege was the only privilege approved of by Jeremy Bentham-in stark contrast to his views
that evidentiary privileges were "rubbish." Id. at 466; see also supra note I and accompanying
text (discussing Jeremy Bentham's views on evidentiary privileges).
36. The Fifth Amendment provides in relevant part that "[n]o person shall ... be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Some scholars have
explored the issue of the Fifth Amendment as it pertains to the disclosure of mental health
information in criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Barbara Gilleran-Johnson & Gloria A. Kristopek,
Post-Conviction Challenges to the Death Penalty: Mental Health Records and the Fifth
Amendment, 32 LOY. U. C.
L.J. 425 (2001) [hereinafter Post-Conviction Challenges].

Specifically, Gilleran-Johnson and Kristopek underscore the intersection of the Fifth Amendment
and the MHDDCA, and in particular, court-ordered psychiatric examinations. Id. at 442-43.
Citing to the United States Supreme Court decision in Estelle v. Smith, Gilleran-Johnson and
Kristopek indicate that the crucial question in determining whether the Fifth Amendment applies
to court-ordered psychiatric examinations is the use of the information, and where "a psychiatrist
had relied upon the defendant's ... remarks[,] the State's later use of the psychiatrist's testimony
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37
Illinois has recognized all of these privileges.
With the exception of the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination, these early evidentiary privileges were aimed at
protecting the confidential communication between two or more
persons. 38 As this section will discuss, the general physician-patient
privilege and the psychotherapist-patient privilege, in both the federal

and Illinois contexts, have evolved within this idea of sacred
confidential communications, and it is an important concept to
acknowledge when assessing the Illinois courts'
39
interpreting the MHDDCA.
B.

effectiveness in

Privileges in the Medical Context, Generally

The history behind the physician-patient privilege is important to the
discussion of the MHDDCA because this privilege served as the
precursor to the MHDDCA. 40 As a result, the MHDDCA's textual
deviations from the physician-patient privilege underscore the need to
independently assess its applicability, and the history of the physicianpatient privilege helps to illustrate the purpose and parameters of the
MHDDCA. First, this section will discuss the physician-patient
privilege as it is codified in Illinois, focusing on its similarities to the

implicate[s] the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 443 (citing to Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981)).
37. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-801 (2008) (spousal privilege); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/8-803 (2008) (clergy-penitent privilege); People v. Adam, 280 N.E.2d 205, 207 (Ill.
1972)
(establishing the attorney-client privilege). Illinois common law recognizes other privileges. See,
e.g., People ex rel. Dep't of Prof'l Regulation v. Manos, 782 N.E.2d 237, 243-44 (I1. 2002)
(dentists constitute surgeons for purpose of physician-patient privilege); Thomas v. Page, 837
N.E.2d 483, 490-91 (111. App. Ct. 2005) (judicial deliberation privilege); In re Marriage of
Daniels, 607 N.E.2d 1255, 1262-70 (i1. App. Ct. 1992) (law enforcement investigatory
privilege).
38. See, e.g., Trammel, 445 U.S. at 45 (noting confidential bases of spousal privilege); see
also, e.g., EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES, supra note 29, at 828 (noting that, for example, the
spousal privilege is "based on 'the deepest and soundest principles of our nature,' suggesting that
any inroad on the privilege would 'destroy the best solace of human existence') (citation
omitted). Congruent with these ideals of confidentiality, evidentiary privileges are also in part
related to the individual constitutional right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, though an elaborate discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this
Comment. See In re Marriage of Bonneau, 691 N.E.2d 123, 128 (I1. App. Ct. 1998) (citing
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1977); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484
(1965); Family Life League v. Dep't of Public Aid, 478 N.E.2d 432, 434-36 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1985))
(finding that in balancing the interest in confidentiality against the need for disclosure, "courts
must also consider a party's constitutional right to privacy").
39. See infra Parts 11.B, C (analyzing rationales for Illinois's physician-patient privilege and
the federal psychotherapist-patient privilege).
40. See infra Part HI.A.l (citing to the original evidentiary act in Illinois, the Act of 1872, to
which the physician-patient privilege was added prior to the promulgation of the MHDDCA).
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will discuss the privacy
current MHDDCA. 4 1 Then, this section
42
context.
federal
the
protections within
1. The Physician-Patient Privilege in Illinois
Given that the predecessor to the MHDDCA evolved directly from
the Illinois physician-patient privilege, 4 3 a discussion of this privilege is
necessary to properly understand the MHDDCA's roots and evaluate
whether Illinois courts are correctly interpreting the MHDDCA. 44
Congruent with the early models of evidentiary privileges, 4 5 the Illinois
legislature first promulgated a physician-patient privilege in part based
on the belief that creating a legally sanctioned confidential relationship
would induce patients to seek comprehensive treatment. 4 6 Accordingly,
the Illinois physician-patient privilege bars physicians and surgeons
from disclosing any information obtained through the professional
medical-patient relationship; however, it only prohibits the disclosure of
to enable [the physician]
information considered "necessary
47
professionally to serve the patient."
The physician-patient privilege further provides for certain
exceptions that allow the disclosure of medical records. The exception
most relevant to this Comment pertains to disclosure in civil, criminal,
or administrative proceedings-disclosure is allowed where the
41. See infra Part ll.B.1 (analyzing the Illinois physician-patient privilege).
42. See infra Part II.B.2 (analyzing the federal privacy protections).
43. See infra Part II.A. 1 (discussing the history of the MHDDCA).
44. See infra Parts 11 and IV (discussing and analyzing the MHDDCA and the Illinois courts'
interpretation of the privilege).
45. See supra notes 28-38 and accompanying text (citing to historical privileges and general
rationales of maintaining confidentiality and encouraging communications).
46. 4A JERALD S. SOLOVY ET AL., ILLINOIS CIVIL LITIGATION GUIDE § 4.60 cmt. 1 (2009)
[hereinafter SOLOVY, CIVIL LITIGATION] (citing Moore v. Centreville Twp. Hosp., 616 N.E.2d
1321, 1327 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 634 N.E.2d 1102 (1994)) ("The privilege
was created to encourage full disclosure of all medical facts by a patient in order to ensure the
best diagnosis and treatment for patients ...."). The first codification of the physician-patient
privilege in Illinois was in 1959, when the Illinois "Act in regard to evidence and deposition in
civil cases" of 1872 was amended. Act of 1872 § 5.1 (1959) (currently codified at 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/8-802 (2008)) ("Physician or Surgeon disclosing information of patient"). The
text of this privilege has not undergone any significant changes since its original promulgation.
47. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-802 (2008). Though this provision had been amended by
Public Act 89-7, the Illinois Supreme Court subsequently found that Public Act unconstitutional
in its entirety. Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1105-06 (11. 1997) (finding that
because provisions of Public Act 89-7 pertaining to caps on non-economic damages were
unconstitutional and the remaining provisions were not severable, the entirety of Public Act 89-7
was unconstitutional). New York and California were the first states to enact statutes codifying
the physician-patient privilege in 1828 and 1878, respectively. Stephen A. Saltzburg, Privileges
and Professionals:Lawyers and Psychiatrists,66 VA. L. REV. 597, 616 (1980) (citation omitted)
[hereinafter Privilegesand Professionals].
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patient's physical (or mental, in actions preceding the MHDDCA)
condition is "at issue."4 8 This "at issue" language controlled disclosure
of records pertaining to mental illness treatment until the addition of the
49
early form of the psychotherapist-patient privilege in 1963.
2. The Federal Privacy Protections
Though the general physician-patient privilege is well established in
state practice, 50 the United States Supreme Court has not officially
recognized it in the federal context. 5 1 Thus, the only common law
medical provider-patient privilege recognized by the United States
Supreme Court through Federal Rule of Evidence 501 is the
psychotherapist-patient privilege. 5 2
Congress, however, created
48. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-802 (2008). Because the physician-patient privilege also
provides that in instances in which there is a conflict with the MHDDCA, the MHDDCA will
control, id., the physician-patient privilege will only be discussed insofar as it is the predecessor
to the MHDDCA. For an application of this "at issue" provision as it pertains to the physicianpatient privilege, see, e.g., Kraima v. Ausman, 850 N.E.2d 840, 846 (11. App. Ct. 2006) (holding
that the "defendant did not affirmatively place his medical condition at issue simply because
plaintiff alleged in the amended complaint that [defendant] was physically limited by arthritis
when he performed the surgery").
49. See infra notes 84-88 and accompanying text (noting change in text of privilege from
original notation to mental health records in the physician-patient privilege to the more specific §
5.2 of the first psychotherapist-patient privilege). The physician-patient privilege does not cover
identifying information such as the name or address of the patient. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-802
(2008). Moreover, it is the burden of the party asserting the privilege to "show facts giving rise to
the privilege."

SOLOVY, CIVIL LITIGATION, supra note 46 (citing Giangiulio v. Ingalls Mem'l

Hosp., 850 N.E.2d 249, 258 (Il. App. Ct. 2006)). The physician-patient privilege extends to nonparties of litigation. Reagan v. Searcy, 751 N.E.2d 606, 610 (Il.
App. Ct. 2001). Records
pertaining to AIDS or drug abuse and alcoholism testing or treatment, however, though not
excluded from coverage under the general physician-patient privilege, are specifically covered by
separate evidentiary privileges. Alcoholism & Other Drug Abuse & Dependency Act, 20 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 301 (2008); AIDS Confidentiality Act, 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/9-10 (2008).
Accordingly, the existence of these independent statutes governing the confidentiality of such
records has precluded the courts from finding alcoholism records covered by the MHDDCA. See,
e.g., Maxwell v. Hobart Corp., 576 N.E.2d 268, 270 (111.App. Ct. 1991) (finding that the
legislature did not intend for "mental health services" to include alcoholism treatment and also
finding that disclosure of those records is governed by the Alcoholism and Other Drug
Dependency Act).
50. Ralph Reubner & Leslie Ann Reis, Hippocrates to HIPAA: A Foundationfor a Federal
Physician-Patient Privilege, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 505. 508, 564 n.439 (2004) [hereinafter

Hippocrates] (citing to, for example, the Alaska, California, Michigan, Illinois, New York, and
Texas statutes codifying the physician-patient privilege and noting that an "overwhelming
majority" of states recognize a physician-patient privilege).
51.

Hippocrates,supra note 50, at 507-08.

52. Id. at 509. In the federal judicial system, Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides that the
federal courts have the authority to create evidentiary privileges "in light of reason and
experience." FED. R. EvID. 501. Accordingly, there is no federal statutory codification of
evidentiary privileges. The codification of Rule 501 was the result of a long political struggle
between Congress and the United States Supreme Court. FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory
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"unprecedented protection" 53 for patient privacy of general medical
treatment and communications 54 through the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (hereinafter "HIPAA"),5 5 and
specifically, the regulations under HIPAA that are collectively referred
56
to as the Privacy Rule.
Congress promulgated HIPAA with the intent that it would serve as a
baseline for patient privacy. 57 As such, one of HIPAA's purposes is to

protect the confidentiality of health information as it is transmitted
through and collected by electronic portals. 58 The Privacy Rule under
HIPAA further protects patients' health information by protecting the
59
use, distribution, and control of an individual's health information.

Though HIPAA contains a preemption provision, 60 the provision does
not provide for preemption where a state law is more stringent than the
privacy protections afforded in HIPAA. 6 1 Thus, because in Illinois the
committee's note. Indeed, although the Supreme Court had at one time expressly suggested the
enactment of a psychotherapist-patient privilege, Congress rejected the specific statutory
privileges and instead promulgated Rule 501 to serve as a flexible guide through which the
federal courts could determine the applicability of common law privileges. EvIDENCE UNDER
THE RULES, supra note 29, at 760. The difficulties with which Congress attempted to enact
privileges, and the continued controversy in recognizing privileges, underscore the continuous
need to assess the interpretation and application of evidentiary privileges.
53. Hippocrates,supra note 50, at 508.
54. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat.
1936 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
55. Id.
56. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462 (Dec.
28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164).
57. Giangiulio v. Ingalls Mem'l Hosp., 850 N.E.2d 249, 264 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
58. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462
(Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164) (noting that the Privacy Rule protections
"beg[a]n to address growing public concerns that advances in electronic technology... result[ed]
in a substantial erosion of the privacy [of] individually identifiable health information"); see also
Coy v. Wash. County Hosp. Dist., 866 N.E.2d 651, 655 (I11.App. Ct. 2007) (citing to HIPAA and
noting that it applies to health plans, health clearinghouses, and health providers and only to those
that "transmit 'any health information in electronic form in connection with a transaction'
referred to elsewhere in HIPAA"); Hippocrates, supra note 50, at 510 (noting that through
HIPAA, "Congress ... sought to. . . protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of medical
information challenged by [recent] technological advances"). The Coy court also noted that
because only the preceding entities are covered by HIPAA, the judiciary is not covered and
HIPAA does not prevent a court from unsealing, to facilitate public access, judicial records
containing patient medical records. Coy, 866 N.E.2d at 655-56.
59. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 53,182
(Aug. 14, 2002) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164) (explaining the rationale behind the Privacy
Rule and providing for certain amendments to the original rule in order to address "the
unintended negative effects of the Privacy Rule on health care quality or access to health care").
60. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7(a)(1) (2006).
61. 45 C.F.R. § 160.203(b) (2008); see also Giangiulio,850 N.E.2d at 264 (citing to 45 C.F.R.
However, HIIPAA does not
§ 160.203(b) (2005)) ("HIPAA contains a preemption provision ....

2010]

MHDDCA: Lest We Forget the Search for the Truth

895

law pertaining to medical record privacy is more restrictive than
HLPAA, Illinois privacy laws control insofar as their provisions are
more restrictive than HIPAA. 62
C. FederalPrivileges in the Mental Health Context -Jaffee v.
Redmond: The United States Supreme Court Recognizes the
Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege
In 1996, the United States Supreme Court established the federal
psychotherapist-patient privilege 63 and even extended this privilege to
encompass social workers 64 through its decision in Jaffee v.

preempt state laws that are more stringent.").
62. Giangiulio, 850 N.E.2d at 264-65 (citing Moss v. Amira, 826 N.E.2d 1001 (lll.
App. Ct.
2005) (Quinn, J., specially concurring)); see also Coy, 866 N.E.2d at 656-57.
Illinois has a strong and broad public policy in favor of protecting the privacy rights of
individuals with respect to their medical information ....
Individuals have a right to
and an expectation of privacy related to their medical information, and this right and
expectation of privacy is reflected in our public policy.
Id.
63. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1996). The Jaffee Court "relied exclusively on
instrumental reasoning to justify the recognition of the privilege." THE NEW WIGMORE, supra
note 1, at 503. Instrumentalist reasoning posits that "a privilege is an essential instrument or
means to the end of promoting certain desirable social consequences. The court creates the
privilege to advance the goal of achieving the desired consequences." Id. at 111-12. A
peripheral issue about the privilege protecting confidentiality of mental health records is the
professional obligation of the provider to protect the records of a patient from disclosure. See
Jana L. Fischer, What Constitutes an Invalid "Blanket Consent" Within the Purview of Illinois'
Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act?, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 535,
539 (2002) [hereinafter Blanket Consent] (discussing the connection between the professional
obligation to maintain confidentiality and the provisions of the MHDDCA). The ethics standards
set forth by various organizations representing mental health providers unanimously
"memorialize the tenet that it is a [provider's] primary obligation to protect and respect
confidentiality." Id.; see also AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS 6
(2009), http://www.psych.org/MainMenu/PsychiatricPractice/Ethics/ResourcesStandards/
PrinciplesofMedicalEthics.aspx ("[C]onfidentiality is essential to psychiatric treatment ....
Because of the sensitive and private nature of the information with which the psychiatrist deals,
he or she must be circumspect in the information that he or she chooses to disclose to others about
a patient."); AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE
OF CONDUCT R. 4, at 7-8 (2002), http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/code.pdf ("Psychologists have a
primary obligation to take reasonable precautions to protect confidential information obtained
through or stored in any medium ....).
64. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 15. In Jaffee, the defendant, a police officer, responded to a violent
incident in Hoffman Estates. Id. at 4. There was some factual dispute as to what happened upon
the officer's arrival at the scene, but the undisputed result was that the defendant, Officer
Redmond, shot and killed decedent Allen (on whose behalf the plaintiff Jaffee was bringing suit).
Id. Jaffee learned through the course of discovery that after shooting decedent Allen, Officer
Redmond "had participated in about 50 counseling sessions with.., a clinical social worker." Il
at 5. In an effort to equilibrate witnesses' testimony as to the events in question with Officer
Redmond's original report, Jaffee sought specific records from the counseling session limited to
only those instances in which Officer Redmond disclosed her memory of the events in question.
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Redmond.65 In so holding, the Jaffee Court made a number of
important statements in dictum that have resonated with proponents of
the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 6 6 As a result, even though the
Jaffee decision came down almost twenty years after the MHDDCA's

in Illinois cases
promulgation, its rationale has become influential 67
because it supports a broad application of the privilege.
First, the Jaffee Court noted that in order to be effective,
psychotherapy requires a confidential environment that allows the
patient to be comfortable in making full disclosure. 6 8 As a result, this

confidential environment must exist because according to the Court, the
possibility of losing confidentiality-and the consequent impediment to
patient disclosure-limits the benefits of psychotherapy. 69 In addition
to this private interest, the Court asserted that the privilege serves the
public interest of encouraging persons to seek treatment. 70 As the Court
stated, "[t]he mental health of our citizenry, no less than its physical
health, is a public good of transcendent importance." 7 1 In contrast to

Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 5, Jaffee, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) (No. 95-266). The need for these
records competed with society's need to ensure that all police were in fact competent to
"discharge their sensitive duties." Id. at 17 ("'[T]he public should not bear the risk that
employees who may suffer from impaired perceptions and judgment' will be permitted to
discharge their sensitive duties because of a broad counseling privilege."). "Respondents [,
however,] vigorously resisted the discovery." Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 5. The district court disagreed
with Officer Redmond's contention that there existed a psychotherapist-patient privilege, and the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, recognizing the psychotherapist-patient privilege
under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. at 6-7.
65. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 1.
66. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the Mental Health Ass'n in Ill. In Support of
Defendants-Appellees at 6-7, Norskog v. Pfiel, 755 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2001) (No. 89985) (relying on
the Jaffee decision and discussing psychological and social rationales for psychotherapist-patient
privilege); Brief Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellees for Bazelon Ctr. for Mental
Health Law et a]. In Support of Affirmance at 4-6, Norskog, 755 N.E.2d 1 (No. 89985) (citing to
Jaffee for rationales behind the psychotherapist-patient privilege; namely, that the "mere
possibility of disclosure" impedes the psychotherapeutic relationship and that only the "certainty"
of confidentiality will facilitate proper disclosure during therapy).
67. For examples of cases citing to Jaffee in support of prohibiting disclosure under the
MHDDCA, see Norskog, 755 N.E.2d at 10; Giangiulio v. Ingalls Mem'l Hosp., 850 N.E.2d 249,
App. Ct. 2006); Chand v. Patla, 795 N.E.2d 403, 409 (1Il. App. Ct. 2003).
262 (Ill.
68. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10 (stating that "[e]ffective psychotherapy . . . depends upon an
atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient is willing to make a frank and complete
disclosure"); see also Giangiulio, 850 N.E.2d at 262 (citing to this same Jaffee language); Chand,
795 N.E.2d at 409 (citing to this same Jaffee language).
69. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10 (stating that "the mere possibility of disclosure may impede
development of the confidential relationship necessary for successful treatment"); see also
Giangiulio,850 N.E.2d at 262 (citing to this same Jaffee language); Chand, 795 N.E.2d at 410
(citing to this same Jaffee language).
70. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11.
71. Id.; see also Norskog, 755 N.E.2d at 10 (citing to Jaffee with respect to importance of
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the importance of these public and private interests, the Court found that
the evidentiary benefit from denial of the privilege would be7 2so low that
the aforementioned interests must be considered paramount.
Ill. DISCUSSION

Due to the complexity of evidentiary privileges and how they impair
the judicial system's truth-seeking function, 7 3 the general history of
privileges in all contexts serves as an undercurrent to the
psychotherapist-patient privilege in Illinois. Moreover, a discussion of
the MHDDCA's legislative history as well as its specific language is
necessarily part of determining the propriety of the Illinois courts'
interpretations of the MHDDCA. Accordingly, this Part will describe
the MHDDCA's legislative history, 74 its current sections and
definitions, 7 5 and the section at issue, section 10(a)(1). 7 6 This Part will
then outline the inconsistent way that Illinois courts have applied
section 10(a)(1) by contrasting the Illinois Supreme Court's Norskog v.
Pfie177 and Goldberg v. Davis78 decisions.
A. The Illinois Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities
ConfidentialityAct
To understand the MHDDCA's nuances, it is necessary to first
discuss in detail the provisions enumerated within, and the history
behind, the MHDDCA. Consequently, this section will first discuss the
promulgation of the MHDDCA, focusing on the statute that preceded
it. 79 Next, this section will highlight the primary sections of the
MHDDCA and their associated definitions. 80 Lastly, to serve as a
precursor to the remainder of this Comment, this section will discuss
section 10(a)(1) of the MHDDCA.81
privilege and ubiquitous nature of similar privileges in all 50 states).
72. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11 (noting that "the likely evidentiary benefit that would result from the

denial of the privilege is modest").
73. See supra Parts I-ll.A (discussing the role of evidentiary privileges in contrast to the

court's function as truth seeker).
74. See infra Part IILA. I (describing the MHDDCA's legislative history).
75. See infra Part Ill.A.2 (citing to the MHDDCA's various sections and their corresponding
definitions).
76. See infra Part 1II.A.3 (discussing in detail section 10(a)(1) of the MHDDCA).
77. See infra Part llI.B.l.a (discussing the "at issue" standard as applied to section 10(a)(1)).
78. See infra Part Ll.B.l.b (discussing the "introduction" standard as applied to section
10(a)(1)).
79. See infra Part IIL.A. 1 (describing the history behind the MHDDCA).
80. See infra Part I.A.2 (citing to and describing the various provisions of the MHDDCA).
81. See infra Part ]I.A.3 (highlighting section 10(a)(1)'s provisions).
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82
1. History of Promulgation
Prior to the MHDDCA, there were various statutes governing the
disclosure and confidentiality of mental health records. 83 The direct
predecessor to the MHDDCA was the Act of 1872 and its section 5.2,
the latter of which was promulgated in 1963.84 It governed the preMHDDCA psychotherapist-patient privilege as it pertained to disclosure
85
of mental health records in judicial or administrative proceedings.
Section 5.2 extended the privilege to communications relating to mental
health treatment between the provider and the patient, or the patient's
family, so long as the communications were made through the course of
diagnosis or treatment. 86 The plain language of section 5.2 also
expressly excluded from the privilege all communications considered
"relevant," presumably as defined by the pleadings or discovery. 8 7

Accordingly, the plain language of the first psychotherapist-patient
privilege acknowledged that the privilege was outweighed where the
88
information sought was relevant to the case.
As part of a comprehensive effort to revise the Illinois Mental Health
Code, the MHDDCA was drafted and promulgated, in part, to revise
section 5.2, and to compile other statutes that governed the disclosure of
mental health records. 89 In addition to this streamlining function, the
82. Since its promulgation, the Illinois Supreme Court has rendered various amendments to
portions of the the MHDDCA unconstitutional. See, e.g., Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem'l Hosp., Nos.
105741, 105745, 2010 WL 375190 (Ill.
Feb. 4, 2010) (finding Public Act 94-677, which in part
amended section 10, unconstitutional in its entirety); Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d
1057, 1105-06 (Il1. 1997) (holding that Public Act 89-7, which in part amended a portion of
section 10, was unconstitutional in its entirety); see also Almgren v. Rush-Presbyterian-St.
Luke's Med. Ctr., 642 N.E.2d 1264, 1267-68 (Il. 1994) (finding provision 10(b) of the
MHDDCA an unconstitutional infringement on the court's rule-making power "to the extent that
[it] ...attempts to provide for appeals from less than final judgments").
83. See, e.g., Act of 1872 § 5.2 (1963) (codified in part at 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110 (2008))
(adding psychotherapist-patient privilege to Illinois' original evidentiary statute); see also 80th
Sess. Deb., supra note 4,at 63 (noting that the MHDDCA compiled numerous other statutes
governing the confidentiality of mental health records and communications).
84. Act of 1872 § 5.2 (1963) (codified in part at 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110 (2008)).
85. Section 5.2 applied "[iun civil or criminal cases, in proceedings preliminary thereto, and in
legislative and administrative proceedings." Act of 1872 § 5.2 (1963) (codified in part at 740 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 110 (2008)). Section 5.2 was an amendment to "[a]n Act in regard to evidence and
depositions in civil cases," which was enacted in 1872 and to which the general physician-patient
privilege was added in 1959. Id.
86. Act of 1872 § 5.2 (1963) (codified in part at 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110 (2008)); see also
infra notes 275-77 and accompanying text (discussing the Illinois courts' definitions of
"relevancy").
87. Act of 1872 § 5.2 (1963) (codified in part at 740 ILL. CoMp. STAT. 110 (2008)).
88. See id. (implying that disclosure is appropriate where the evidence sought to be admitted
is relevant).
89. In 1973, then-Illinois Governor Dan Walker established a Commission for Revision of the
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MHDDCA's goal was to ensure the confidentiality of persons entering
into therapeutic relationships. 90 Though the MHDDCA is perceived to
have created a large obstacle for proponents of disclosure, 9 1 in reality
the specific section at issue in this Comment--current MHDDCA
section 10(a)(1)-actually expanded section 5.2. This is so because
92
unlike section 5.2 and the initially proposed confidentiality law,

section 10(a)(1) created an exception not only where the mental health
an aspect of the services
condition itself is introduced, but also where
93
received for that condition is introduced.
Mental Health Code in Illinois. REPORT, GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION FOR THE REVISION OF THE
MENTAL HEALTH CODE IN ILLINOIS, at vi (1976) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT]. The
Commission proposed revisions to the Illinois Code in the following areas: (1) the rights of
recipients of mental health services; (2) procedural due process for persons with mental illness or
developmental disabilities; (3) guardianship; (4) legal advocacy services; (5) human rights; (6)
confidentiality of records; (7) fitness to stand trial; and (8) community mental health. Id. at 1.
With respect to the confidentiality of mental health records, the enumerated impetus for a revised
law was the desire to consolidate existing confidentiality laws and to ensure that the law covered
all therapeutic relationships. Id. at 5; see also 80th Sess. Deb., supra note 4, at 63 (noting that
previous statutes governed the varying therapeutic professions using different standards, and
"frequently in an inconsistent manner"). The entire psychotherapist community, including
psychologists, psychiatrists, and law enforcement, was involved in the drafting of the MHDDCA
and the members of this community fully supported the MHDDCA. Id. at 63-64. The bill
received almost unanimous support in the House, with only one "nay." 2 J. OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE EIGHTIETH GEN. ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF ILL. 2841, 3018 (1978
Sess.). Then-Governor James R. Thompson signed the legislation into law on January 9, 1979.
Legislative Reference Bureau - Eightieth Gen. Assemb., Action on all Bills and Resolutions
received through Feb. 13, 1979, 1 LEGIS. SYNOPSIS & DIG. 1, 51 (1978).
90. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 89, at 5 (describing that because "current Illinois
statutes accord a privilege of confidentiality only to certain designated therapeutic professionals.
. . [and because] there is no statutory privilege available to protect persons consulting therapists
other than those specifically designated ... the need for consolidation ... is apparent"); Johnston
v. Weil, 920 N.E.2d 494, 500 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (citing Quigg v. Walgreen Co., 905 N.E.2d 293,
298 (111. App. Ct. 2009)) ("Because [one of] the [MHDDCA's] goals is to ensure the
confidentiality of therapeutic relationships, it only includes 'those persons entering into a
therapeutic relationship."').
91. The Illinois Supreme Court has described rendering disclosure under the MHDDCA as "a
formidable challenge." Reda v. Advocate Health Care, 765 N.E.2d 1002, 1010 (111. 2002);
Norskog v. Pfiel, 755 N.E.2d 1, 10 (111. 2001). Courts have also used the language that the court
"must zealously guard against erosion of the confidentiality privilege." Norskog, 755 N.E.2d at
10; People v. Campobello, 810 N.E.2d 307, 314-15 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). This language is
supported by the idea that without such a "formidable challenge," waiver of confidentiality
"would result in opening a pandora's box of inquiry into the mental condition of claimants."
Thiele v. Ortiz, 520 N.E.2d 881, 888 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); see also Mandziara v. Canulli, 701
N.E.2d 127, 133 (I11.App. Ct. 1998) ("The General Assembly has made a strong statement about
the importance of keeping mental health records confidential.").
92. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 89, at 169 (providing for disclosure only where the
recipient's condition is introduced); Act of 1872 § 5.2 (1963) (triggering disclosure only where
"the patient [has] introduced his mental condition").
93. Laurent v. Breiji, 392 N.E.2d 929, 932 (111. App. Ct. 1979) (finding that in contrast to the
previous acts governing the psychotherapist-patient privilege only allowing for a waiver of
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2. General Sections and Definitions
Notwithstanding the specifically enumerated exceptions

for

disclosure, the MHDDCA generally serves to protect the confidentiality
of recipients of mental health services. 94 Indeed, such records are
entirely privileged unless they fall within one of the exceptions to the
MHDDCA 95 or the recipient waives the privilege. 9 6 It has been
recognized, however, that the privileges contained within the
MHDDCA are not absolute. 97 In fact, the MHDDCA's enumerated

exceptions suggest the legislative intent to recognize that in certain
limited

circumstances,

non-consensual

98
communications is appropriate.

disclosure

of

covered

To fall within the penumbra of the MHDDCA's privilege, the record
or communication needs to both "concern" 99 the recipient and be

recorded through the provision of mental health services.100 The record,
confidentiality when the recipient introduced his or her condition, the modern MHDDCA allows
for a waiver of the privilege when the recipient introduced either his or her condition or an aspect
of the services received on behalf of that condition).
94. ILLINOIS PRACTICE SERIES - MHDDCA § 28.8, supra note 3. Under the MHDDCA, a
"recipient" is defined to include "any person who is receiving or has received mental health or
developmental disabilities services." 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/3(a) (2008).
95. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/3(a) (2008) ("All records and communications shall be
confidential and shall not be disclosed except as provided in this Act"); Giangiulio v. Ingalls
Mem'l Hosp., 850 N.E.2d 249, 261 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (noting that "the [MHDDCA] is carefully
drawn to maintain the confidentiality of mental health records except in the specific
circumstances explicitly enumerated.") (citation omitted) (quotation omitted); Laurent, 392
N.E.2d at 931 (citing to the MHDDCA and stating that "the [MHDDCA] is premised on a general
prohibition against the disclosure of such information except where specifically provided for in
the Act"); see also infra notes 105-06 and accompanying text (citing to the enumerated
exceptions for disclosure under the MHDDCA).
96. See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing the application of waivers in Illinois cases interpreting
and applying the MHDDCA).
97. Laurent, 392 N.E.2d at 932 ("[L]egislative recognition of a testimonial privilege does not
Dep't of Prof'l Regulation, 793 N.E.2d
afford absolute protection against disclosure."); Doe v. Ill.
119, 125 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) ("[Tjhe privilege against disclosure is not absolute.").
98. Doe, 793 N.E.2d at 126 ("[I]t is clear that the legislature contemplated the use of mental
health records for which no consent has been secured in certain judicial proceedings."); Laurent,
392 N.E.2d at 932 ("[T]he legislature acknowledged the countervailing societal needs which
demand disclosure in certain instances.").
99. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/2 (2008) (providing that to be a covered record, the record must
"concern[] the recipient and the services provided").
App. Ct. 1990)
100. Id.; see also House v. SwedishAmerican Hosp., 564 N.E.2d 922, 928 (Ill.
(finding that the identity of an assailant-patient was discoverable despite an assertion of privilege
under the MHDDCA because, at the time of the attack, the patient was not in the hospital for
psychiatric services, but rather for "regular" medical care). As defined by the MHDDCA,
covered "services include, but are not limited to, examination, diagnosis, evaluation, treatment,
training, pharmaceuticals, aftercare, habilitation or rehabilitation." 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/2
(2008); see also Quigg v. Walgreen Co., 905 N.E.2d 293, 299 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2009) (holding that
because Walgreen's was not engaging in a therapeutic relationship by "act[ing] purely as a
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however, does not include the provider's personal notes regarding the
patient and as the work product of the provider, they are not subject to

discovery irrespective of whether the patient's other records are
discoverable. 1 0 ' The MHDDCA also extends privilege protection to
communications made by a recipient both to a mental health provider

and in the presence of other persons so long as the communication was
made "during or in connection to" the provision of mental health
services.10 2 The MHDDCA further renders confidential the pure fact
that an individual is a recipient of such services. 10 3 Lastly, unless
otherwise provided for, solely the recipient holds the privilege and can
consent to disclosure. 10 4 The privilege, however, can generally be
waived in three ways: (1) by the recipient's consent to disclosure; 10 5 (2)
pharmacist," it was not subject to liability under the MHDDCA); Suarez v. Pierard, 663 N.E.2d
1039, 1042 (111.App. Ct. 1996) (finding that "the concept of a therapeutic relationship is [not] so
expansive that it includes a routine transaction with a pharmacist"). Compare People v. Gemeny,
where the court held that "communications during services" encompassed communications made
between a court ordered therapist and criminal defendant whereby the defendant left threatening
messages on the therapist's answering machines. People v. Gemeny, 731 N.E.2d 844, 852 (I1.
App. Ct. 1980)
App. Ct. 2000); see also In re Marriage of Semmler, 413 N.E.2d 502, 506 (Ill.
(holding that "[w]here a person makes statements to a therapist in a professional consultation,
those statements are privileged").
101. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/2 (2008). The providers note exclusion encompasses three
categories:
(1) information disclosed to the therapist in confidence by other persons on condition
that such information would never be disclosed to the recipient or other persons; (2)
information disclosed to the therapist by the recipient which would be injurious to the
recipient's relationships to other persons; or (3) the therapist's speculations,
impressions, hunches and reminders.
App. Ct. 1998) ("[A]ny documents
Id.; see also In re Estate of Bagus, 691 N.E.2d 401, 405 (Ill.
that the trial court determines are personal notes shall not be disclosed to the estate or its
attorneys."). If, however, such records are disclosed to another person, they become a part of the
recipient's "record" and once it becomes part of the recipient's discoverable record, it is no longer
considered the "personal note" of the provider. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/2 (2008).
102. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/2 (2008); cf Gemeny, 731 N.E.2d at 849 ("Nothing in the
definition of 'communication' limits that term to statements made during an actual treatment
session ... the legislature showed its willingness to protect statements made outside the formal
treatment process itself .... The professional relationship cannot be neatly confined to what
").
happens in formal treatment sessions ....
103. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/2 (2008). The MHDDCA does, however, provide that certain
parties are entitled to inspect and copy a recipient's mental health records including parents or
guardians of patients under the age of twelve or over eighteen, recipients over the age of twelve,
or powers of attorney for healthcare or property. Id. § 110/4(a)(l)-(6).
104. Id. § l10/10(a); Novak v. Rathnam, 478 N.E.2d 1334, 1337 (Ill. 1985); Chi. Hous. Auth.
v. Human Rights Comm'n, 759 N.E.2d 37, 51 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
105. The MHDDCA provides for various ways by which a recipient can consent to disclosure
of his or her records subject to the limitations imposed by the MHDDCA. See 740 ILL. CoMP.
STAT. 110/5 (2008) (enumerating applicability of consent and specific requirements of valid
consent). Though the MHDDCA expressly indicates that blanket consents to disclosure are
invalid, id. § 110/5(7), scholars have questioned the extent to which that provision protects
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application of an enumerated exception; 10 6 or (3) the recipient's failure
to object during trial when the opposing party offers material covered
by the MHDDCA. 107
3. Section 10(a)(1) - Disclosure in Civil, Criminal, Administrative, and
Legislative Proceedings

Section 10(a)(1) of the MHDDCA provides an exception for the
disclosure of records during the course of civil, criminal, or "other
proceedings,"' 10 8 and is a highly litigated provision of the MHDDCA.1 09
recipients from non-consensual disclosure of records. See, e.g., Blanket Consent, supra note 63,
at 543-56 (discussing insufficiency of the 'blanket consent' provision and criticizing signed
authorization forms that serve as "prima facie evidence of valid consent"). The MHDDCA
additionally provides for a few exceptions by which records can lawfully be disclosed without
consent of the recipient. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/6-9.3 (2008). These provisions provide for
the non-consensual disclosure of records in an application for benefits where the recipient is not
able to consent "despite every reasonable effort. .. to obtain consent," id. § 110/6, during agency
review "for purposes of licensure, statistical compilation, research, evaluation, or other similar
purposes," id. § 110/n, interagency disclosures between agencies of the state, id. §§ 110/7.1, 9.19.2, records of the developmentally disabled residing in facilities where notice has been given to
the recipient, id. § 110/8.1, between providers in a professional capacity, id. § 110/9, of persons
receiving treatment under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, id. § 110/9.3, and for
various other rationale including to warn specific individuals or the initiation or continuation of
civil commitment proceedings. See, e.g., id. § 110/1 l(i)-(xii) (providing additional avenues for
non-consensual disclosure).
106. Along with the exceptions enumerated in section 10(a)(1), the MHDDCA provides
exceptions to disclosure in civil and criminal proceedings including, but not limited to, claims
against the provider for injuries incurred by the recipient during the course of providing such
services, id. § 110/10(a)(3), records or communications made to a provider in the course of a
good faith court-ordered examination provided the recipient has been adequately informed of the
lack of confidentiality or privilege, id. § 110/10(a)(4), and proceedings to determine fitness to
stand trial or competency for guardianship, id. § 110/10(a)(5).
107. People v. Leggans, 625 N.E.2d 1133, 1139 (111.App. Ct. 1993) (noting that because the
defendant-recipient had not properly objected to the introduction of his mental health records at
trial, he waived the issue on appeal, as well as the privilege). The MHDDCA enumerates other
provisions that provide for the miscellaneous disclosure of records as they pertain to
investigations by the United States Secret Service and the Department of State Police. 740 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 110/12 (2008). Lastly, there is a provision creating a statutory cause of action for
damages, an injunction, "or other appropriate relief' to a party aggrieved by a violation of the
MHDDCA. Id. § 110/15.
108. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/10(a) (2008).
109. See infra notes 142-43 (citing cases specifically dealing with section 10(a)(1)). Section
10 of the MHDDCA also provides procedural rules governing admission and exceptions for
admissibility in several other miscellaneous proceedings. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/10(b)-(f)
(2008). In the Ninety-Sixth General Assembly, the Illinois Legislature amended section 10(f) by
enacting Public Act 96-406. H.B. 3843, 2009 Leg., 96th Sess. (Ill. 2009). The amendment
allows for investigations made by the Department of Human Services Act (instead of the Abused
and Neglected Long Term Care Facility Residents Reporting Act), permits disclosure pursuant to
The Department of Human Services Act when the records are relevant to issues in health care
worker registry hearings, and precludes disclosure or re-disclosure except in connection with the
above action. Id.
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Commonly known as the patient-litigant exception, 110 this provision has
a broad scope and encompasses practically all civil, criminal,
administrative, or legislative proceedings.' 1 1 Courts have recognized
that the purpose of section 10(a)(1) is to facilitate a "sophisticated
balancing test" wherein the court weighs the evidentiary value of mental
health records against the recipient's privacy interests and the interests

of substantial justice. 112 Under section 10(a)(1), unless disclosure falls
113 the recipient has the
within one of its eleven enumerated exceptions, 114
records.
her
or
his
privilege to refuse to disclose

Under section 10(a)(1), three underlying issues determine the
admissibility of mental health records. First, the court must assess
whether the recipient's mental health condition or an aspect of the
services received has been introduced as an element of his or her claim
or defense. 115 Second, the court determines whether the records are
relevant, probative, not unduly prejudicial or inflammatory, and
otherwise clearly admissible. 116 Finally, the court weighs disclosure
against the potential injury to the psychotherapist-patient
1 17
relationship.

Section 10(a)(1) further provides that, except in criminal proceedings
in which a recipient raises an insanity defense, communications
between therapist and recipient are not relevant except for records
concerning the fact of treatment, cost of services, and ultimate diagnosis

110. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 89, at 170 ("[The proposed section 10(a)] is the
so-called patient litigant exception which has been embodied in statutes as a routine matter in
most jurisdictions.").
111. Id.; see also Goldberg v. Davis, 602 N.E.2d 812, 817 (I11.1992) (noting that section 10 of
the MHDDCA is the provision relied upon for disclosure without consent in administrative or
judicial proceedings).
112. Mandziara v. Canulli, 701 N.E.2d 127, 133 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
113. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/10(a) (2008). It has also been held that section 10
encompasses the exceptions set forth in section 7(a). See Doe v. Ill. Dep't of Prof l Regulation,
793 N.E.2d 119, 126 (I11.App. Ct. 2003) (holding that because statutes must be read as a whole,
the "except as provided herein" language of section 10(a) encompassed all of the exceptions
within the entirety of the MHDDCA, not just the eleven specifically referred to under section 10).
114. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/10(a) (2008). The provider or therapist, on behalf of, or if in
the interests of the patient, may also in limited circumstances consent to disclosure. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. § I10/10(a)(l) (mandating that the court must find that "other satisfactory evidence is
demonstrably unsatisfactory . . . and that disclosure is more important to the interests of
substantial justice than protection from injury to the therapist-recipient relationship or to the
recipient or other whom disclosure is likely to harm"). The Illinois Supreme Court has
additionally created an alternative exception for admission, that of "fundamental fairness." See
infra notes 120-32 and accompanying text (analyzing the D.C. v. S.A. decision); see also infra
Parts III.B.2, IV.B, and V.C (discussing the second and third prongs of section 10(a)(1)).
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unless the proponent of disclosure establishes a "compelling" need for
production.1 18 Finally, section 10(a)(1) expressly provides that a claim
for pain and suffering does not per se introduce one's mental
119
condition.
In 1997, the Illinois Supreme Court created an alternative basis for
admission under section 10(a)(1) through its decision in D.C. v.S.A.:
the "fundamental fairness" exception. 120 In D.C. v. S.A., plaintiff D.C.
brought suit against defendant S.A. for injuries arising out of an
automobile accident in which D.C., a pedestrian, was hit by S.A.'s
car. 121 D.C. did not allege any psychological injuries, but did assert that
he was "in the exercise of due care." 122 S.A.'s strategy was to establish
D.C.'s comparative negligence because S.A. had obtained evidence that
12 3
D.C. may have been attempting suicide at the time of the accident.
D.C.'s contributory negligence would have absolved S.A. of any
liability for the injuries. 124 Although the court found that D.C. did not
118. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/10(a)(1) (2008).
119. Id. Under this provision, a claim for pain and suffering constitutes an introduction of the
recipient's mental condition only if either the recipient or a witness on behalf of the recipient
presents testimony pertaining to privileged communications. Id.
120. D.C. v. S.A., 687 N.E.2d 1032, 1040-41 (111.1997). "Fundamental fairness" is a judicial
doctrine that has been applied in many other contexts. See, e.g., People v. Carter, 905 N.E.2d
874, 881 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) ("[F]undamental fairness includes, among other things, seeing to it
that certain basic instructions, essential to a fair determination of the case by the jury, are given.")
(citation omitted); People v. Breedlove, 795 N.E.2d 862, 864 (IIl. App. Ct. 2003) ("'Fundamental
fairness' is a specific exception to the waiver doctrine, which warrants judicial review of
procedurally defaulted claims only if actual prejudice has resulted from the claimed errors.");
City of Quincy v. Diamond Constr. Co., 762 N.E.2d 710, 713 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2002) (noting the trial
court's decision that "fundamental fairness dictated the highest and best use of Diamond's
property").
121. D.C.,687N.E.2dat1034.
122. Id. After the trial court found that plaintiff had indeed placed his mental condition at
issue by asserting his due care, the court ordered disclosure of certain medical records of
plaintiff's post-accident psychiatric care. Id. at 1035. Prior to its decision, the trial court
conducted an in camera review of the records and determined that (1) plaintiff had waived his
privilege when he claimed to be in the exercise of due care; (2) the records were relevant and
probative; (3) while prejudicial, the records were not unduly prejudicial; and (4) the limited
records were admissible because disclosure in the interest of substantial justice outweighed
protection of the privilege. Id. The appellate court reversed by holding that "a plaintiff does not
waive the privilege ... unless he specifically or affirmatively raises the condition as an element
of his claim." Id. at 1036. The appellate court went on to conclude that the per se filing of a
negligence claim "does not require a plaintiff to specifically or affirmatively plead his mental
condition." Id. (quotations omitted).
123. It is unclear from the decision exactly how the defendant came to possess this letter, but
the decision indicates that it was originally written by D.C.'s physician to D.C.'s attorney. Id. at
1035.
124. id. at 1041. The D.C. court highlights an interesting peripheral issue. S.A. asserted that
D.C. bore the burden of proving that his negligence was the sole, proximate cause of his injuries
and thus, D.C. per se placed his mental condition at issue as his condition directly implicated
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place his mental condition "at issue," 125 it nonetheless held that the
"fundamental fairness" doctrine required admission of the evidence
because the information would be dispositive to the issue of S.A.'s

liability. 126
Through its opinion, the court made a few crucial findings that, at the
1 27
time, had the potential to affect future claims under section 10(a)(1).
First, the court found that fundamental fairness and substantial justice
outweigh the privilege when the party seeks to use confidentiality as a
"sword" rather than a protective measure. 128 Second, the court ruled
that disclosure of a "small amount of information" that pertains to
motivation or conduct may be admissible if it does not divulge
diagnoses, treatment, or progress. 129 Finally, the court held that even if
the recipient does not introduce his or her condition as required by
section 10(a)(1), fundamental fairness could nonetheless authorize
admission. 130 While the court expressly emphasized that its decision
was narrow, 13 1 the fundamental fairness doctrine sent waves of fear
through the advocacy community that an expansion of section 10(a)(1)
might lead to the unwarranted disclosure of sensitive mental health
records. 132

defendant's potential liability. Id. at 1038. As the Illinois Supreme Court held, however, "with..
•comparative negligence, both logic and fairness dictate[] that the defendant, who stood to benefit
from a showing [of plaintiff's negligence] . . . [has] the burden of proof on the issue." Id. The
court went on to note that contributory negligence was codified as an affirmative defense by 735
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-613(d) (1994). Id. at 1039.
125. The court held that neither the "boilerplate" language in D.C.'s complaint nor D.C.'s
denial of any contributory negligence effectively placed his mental condition at issue. D.C., 687
N.E.2d at 1039.
126. Id. at 1040-41. The court additionally reviewed the third prong of the 10(a)(l) test and
established that the records sought were relevant, probative, admissible, not unduly prejudicial,
and not obtainable elsewhere. Id. at 1041.
127. The fundamental fairness exception created by D.C. was controversial and had the
potential to affect future cases, but it has not been followed in subsequent decisions. See infra
note 131 and accompanying text (discussing cases that have cited to, but declined to follow, the
fundamental fairness exception).
128. D.C., 687 N.E.2d at 1041.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1040.
131. Id. at 1041. In part as a result of its narrowness, D.C. has been discussed in few cases
and those that discuss it do not follow its rationale. See, e.g., Reda v. Advocate Health Care, 765
N.E.2d 1002, 1011 (111. 2002) (refusing to follow D.C. because plaintiffs were not invoking the
privilege to "exploit or subvert the legal process"); People v. Gemeny, 731 N.E.2d 844, 852 (111.
App. Ct. 2000) ("[Flundamental fairness . . . does not require that defendant surrender his
statutory privilege" where defendant does not use the statute "as a sword.").
132. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the Mental Health Ass'n in Ill. in Support of
Defendants-Appellees at 1, 7-9, Norskog v. Pfiel, 755 N.E.2d 1 (111. 2001) (No. 89985) (arguing
that D.C. "significantly undermines the intent and efficacy of [the MHDDCA]" and as a result,
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Section 1O(a)(1) and the Illinois Courts: A StrainedRelationship

Due to the complex balancing process required to interpret and apply
the MHDDCA, the Illinois courts have engaged in a variety of
interpretive methods when deciding what behavior triggers the section
10(a)(1) exception, and to what extent section 10(a)(1) restricts
disclosure. 133 Illinois courts have come to utilize two primary standards
of admissibility for the first prong of 10(a)(1): "at issue" or
"introduction," and in some cases what appears to be a combination of
the two. 134 Delineating these two methods and illustrating their
applications is imperative to understanding the proper statutory
construct. Accordingly, this section will first discuss the Illinois courts'
application of section 10(a)(1) through the "at issue" standard. 135 This
section will then discuss the Illinois courts' utilization of the
"introduction" standard, the standard that maintains congruency with
the statute's plain language. 136 Lastly, this section will outline the
second and third prongs of section 10(a)(1) and the Illinois courts'
utilization of these prongs in determining mental health record
137
admissibility.
1. Prong One: Recipient's Introduction of Mental Health Condition
The "initial hurdle" 138 to disclosure under section 10(a)(1) requires
the recipient to satisfy the first prong: introduction of his or her
condition "or any aspect of his [or her] services received for such
condition as an element of his [or her] claim or defense." 139 The courts
have largely applied these terms-for example, "introduction"-by

"subjects every (tort) plaintiff to discovery requests concerning mental health treatment" and
should be reconsidered); Brief Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellees for Bazelon Ctr.
for Mental Health Law et al. In Support of Affirmance at 19-20, Norskog, 755 N.E.2d 1 (No.
89985) (similarly requesting that the Illinois Supreme Court overturn D.C., noting that the
decision created a "crack in the certainty of the privilege" which future cases will "attempt[] to

widen").
133. See infra Part III.B.1 (describing the "at issue" and "introduction" standards used by
Illinois courts).
134. See infra Part III.B.1 (describing the "at issue" and "introduction" standards used by
Illinois courts).
135. See infra Part IlI.B.l.a (discussing cases applying an "at issue" standard of
admissibility).
136. See infra Part III.B.l.b (discussing cases applying an "introduction" standard of
admissibility).
137. See infra Parts I.B.2-3 (discussing prongs two and three and the application of waivers
under section 10(a)(l)).
138. Norskog v. Pfiel, 755 N.E.2d 1, 14 (Ill. 2001).
139. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/10(a)(1) (2008).
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140
analyzing the perceived legislative intent for the MHDDCA.
Moreover, despite the statute's plain language, the courts have tended to

primarily assess the admissibility of records under an "at issue"
standard rather than the "introduction" standard set forth in the

statute.141
This section will discuss the overwhelming majority of decisions that
have determined the propriety of admission apparently based on the "at
issue" standard. 142 Though a few cases have utilized the "introduction"
standard set forth in the statute, 14 3 the inconsistency between the
140. The Illinois Supreme Court has recognized that where statutory language is "susceptible
of more than one interpretation, the court may look beyond the language to consider the purposes
2002). Accordingly,
of the statute." Reda v. Advocate Health Care, 765 N.E.2d 1002, 1007 (ill.
the Illinois courts have interpreted the plain language of the statute based on the perceived intent
of the legislature. See, e.g., Norskog, 755 N.E.2d at 9-10 ("[T]he legislature has been careful to
restrict disclosure to that which is necessary to accomplish a particular purpose . . . . When
viewed as a whole, the [MHDDCA] constitutes a 'strong statement' by the General Assembly
about the importance of keeping mental health records confidential."); Chi. Hous. Auth. v.
App. Ct. 2001) ("[Tlhe [MHDDCA] was
Human Rights Comm'n, 759 N.E.2d 37, 51 (I11.
intended to maintain the confidentiality of mental health records except in specific circumstances,
App. Ct.
which have become narrowly drawn."); Mandziara v. Canulli, 701 N.E.2d 127, 133 (I11.
1998) ("[T]he General Assembly has made a strong statement about the importance of keeping
mental health records confidential. If we were to hold Cannulli did not violate the [MHDDCA]..
* we would be rewriting the statute, effectively eroding unmistakable legislative intent."); House
v. SwedishAmerican Hosp., 564 N.E.2d 922, 926 (I11.
App. Ct. 1990) ("This general prohibition
against disclosure of [mental health] information was enacted to protect the patient's privacy
rights, along with providing an inducement to seek such treatment.").
141. See discussion infra Parts m.B.1, IV.A.3.
142. See Norskog, 755 N.E.2d at 12 (finding that though defendant introduced an insanity
defense prior to pleading guilty, "[b]y pleading guilty ...the question of sanity was no longer an
issue" and thus, records pertaining to treatment could not be discovered in a subsequent action);
Chi.Hous. Auth., 759 N.E.2d at 51 (stating that recipient "did not place his mental health at issue
. . . simply by alleging a charge of discrimination based on (mental illness] in his original
complaint .... [Recipient] could have waived it if he had affirmatively placed his mental health
App. Ct. 2000) ("The state's argument is
at issue"); People v. Gemeny, 731 N.E.2d 844, 851 (Ul1.
refuted by case law establishing that [the section 10(a)(1)] exemption applies only when a party
affirmatively places his own mental condition in issue."); Sassali v. Rockford Mem'l Hosp., 693
N.E.2d 1287, 1289 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) ("A recipient waives the confidentiality ... only if she
affirmatively places her own mental condition at issue."); In re Marriage of Bonneau, 691 N.E.2d
123, 130 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (asserting that privilege is waived only where recipient "specifically
or affirmatively place[s] his or her mental or physical health in issue in the pleadings"); Maxwell
v. Hobart Corp., 576 N.E.2d 268, 271 (Il.
App. Ct. 1991) (finding that if the MHDDCA applied
to records for alcoholism treatment, the plaintiff would have "placed his physiological and
biological condition at the time of the accident into issue and made discoverable all information
relating to that condition"); Thiele v. Ortiz, 520 N.E.2d 881, 888 (1I1. App. Ct. 1988) ("[A] claim.
. . under the Wrongful Death Act does not place the decedent's mental condition at issue.");
Bland v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 490 N.E.2d 1327, 1333 (InI. App. Ct. 1986) (holding
that the privilege "can be waived either expressly or by affirmatively placing in issue one's
mental condition .... Unless mental well-being is specifically made an issue by the pleadings,
the privilege pertains").
143. See D.C. v. S.A., 687 N.E.2d 1032, 1039 (111.1997) (holding that "plaintiff's denial of
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decisions underscores the need for an affirmative declaration of the
statutory interpretation. 144 To explore the distinction between these two
standards and their effects, this section will compare the Illinois
Supreme Court's decisions in Norskog v. Pflel 4 5 and Goldberg v.
14 6
Davis.
a. Placing an Element "At Issue" Under Section 10(a)(1)
Though the requirement that the recipient must introduce his or her
mental condition is seemingly simple, many Illinois courts have
struggled to define when and by whom a recipient's condition is
introduced for purposes of disclosure under the MHDDCA. 147 In so
doing, the courts have expansively construed "introduction" to mean "at
issue," and although this Comment asserts that "at issue" is an improper
standard by which to adjudge admission of records under the
MHDDCA, the courts' prevalent application of this standard mandates a
discussion of its elements and effect. 148 This sub-section will highlight
the Illinois cases that have applied the "at issue" standard for 10(a)(1)
admissibility.
Prior to the promulgation of the MHDDCA, cases supported the rule
that disclosure was only proper where a recipient "affirmatively" put his
or her condition "at issue." 149 This language was consistent with the
any contributory negligence... does not by itself.., result in the introduction by plaintiff of his
mental condition"); Goldberg v. Davis, 602 N.E.2d 812, 817 (Il1. 1992) (finding that "[the
recipient] ha[d] introduced her mental condition as well as services received"); In re Estate of
Bagus, 691 N.E.2d 401, 404 (IUl. App. Ct. 1998) (citing to section 10(a)(l) and stating that the
"privilege is waived if the recipient introduces his mental condition," though eventually deciding
the propriety of disclosure based on 10(a)(2)); Laurent v. Brelji, 392 N.E.2d 929, 932 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1979) (finding that patient "introduced an aspect of the services he received for his mental
condition" through testimony at an administrative disciplinary proceeding against his former
physician).
144. See infra Parts IV.A.3, V (discussing the effect of the Illinois courts' variable
interpretations of the 10(a)(1) test and proposing a solution to the variable interpretation of
admissibility under 10(a)(1)); see also infra note 157 and accompanying text (discussing
examples of cases that appear to utilize a hybrid test that applies both the "at issue" and
"introduction" standards).
145. Norskog, 755 N.E.2d at 1.
146. Goldberg, 602 N.E.2d at 812.
147. See supra note 142 (listing cases that discuss the application of section 10(a)(1) using the
"at issue" standard).
148. See also infra Part V (proposing incremental reform to the courts' interpretations and
application of this provision).
149. See, e.g., Tylitzki v. Triple X Serv., Inc., 261 N.E.2d 533, 536 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970)
(holding that the controlling issue in determining "at issue" is whether the recipient affirmatively
placed his or her condition at issue.); Webb v. Quincy City Lines, Inc., 219 N.E.2d 165, 167 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1966) ("[T]he privilege exists unless 'mental condition' is specifically made a part of
either the claim or defense.").
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plain language of the physician-patient privilege that preceded both the

predecessor to the MHDDCA (section 5.2) and the current
MHDDCA. 15 ° This standard, however, has continued under the modem
confidentiality privilege despite the MHDDCA's plain language
condition rather than a
requiring a mere introduction of the recipient's
151
issue."
"at
directly
condition
that
of
placement
Under the "at issue" standard, the recipient may place his or her
condition at issue by "affirmatively" asserting an aspect of that
condition in any part of his or her claim or defense. 152 In this respect,
case law has 153
generally complied with pre-MHDDCA interpretations of
"affirmative"
to mean "specific," with courts holding that unless the
recipient specifically alleges an aspect of his or her condition or a claim
154

for mental suffering, the "affirmative" requirement is not met.

Moreover, a mere allegation for pain and suffering cannot per se place
one's mental condition "at issue," 155 and a recipient's peripheral
assertion of general facts pertaining to his or her mental health does not
place that condition "at issue." 156 Many of these decisions have also

150. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text (discussing the "at issue" standard under
general physician-patient privilege).
151. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text (explaining the three-pronged test for
determining admissibility under 10(a)(l)); see also, e.g., Thiele v. Ortiz, 520 N.E.2d 881, 888 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1988) (citing pre-MHDDCA cases Tylitzki and Webb for the proposition that "unless
mental well-being is specifically made an issue by the pleadings, the privilege of confidentiality
is applicable").
152. See, e.g., Sassali v. Rockford Mem'l Hosp., 693 N.E.2d 1287, 1289 (DI. App. Ct. 1998)
("A recipient waives the confidentiality . . . only if she affirmatively places her own mental
condition at issue."); In re Marriage of Bonneau, 691 N.E.2d 123, 130 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)
(asserting that the privilege is waived only where a recipient "specifically or affirmatively
placels] his or her mental or physical health in issue in the pleadings"); Bland v. Dep't of
Children & Family Servs., 490 N.E.2d 1327, 1333 (Il. App. Ct. 1986) ("[The privilege can be
waived either expressly or by affirmatively placing in issue one's mental condition . . . . Unless
mental well-being is specifically made an issue by the pleadings, the privilege pertains ... ").
153. See, e.g., Tylitzki, 261 N.E.2d at 537 ("[T]he privilege can be waived ... by affirmatively
placing in issue one's physical or mental condition.").
154. See, e.g., Reda v. Advocate Health Care, 765 N.E.2d 1002, 1009-10 (Ill. 2002) (relying
on Tylitzki and Webb for the application of "affirmative"); Bland v. Dep't of Children & Family
Servs., 490 N.E.2d 1327, 1333 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (using same language as Tylitzki that "[u]nless
mental well-being is specifically made an issue by the pleadings, the privilege pertains").
155. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. I 10/10(a)(l) (2008) (expressly stating that a recipient's "mental
condition shall not be deemed to be introduced merely by making [a] claim [for pain and
suffering]").
156. Under the "at issue" standard, an assertion of neurological injury does not suffice to
render records of one's mental health condition admissible even if the plaintiff-recipient
affirmatively introduces an aspect of his or her mental health services in conjunction with
damages. Reda, 765 N.E.2d at 1005. In Reda, the court held that an allegation of neurological
injury did not constitute the placement of one's mental health condition at issue. Id. at 1009. The
plaintiff in Reda, however, had expressly mentioned his psychiatrist in deposition, stating in
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incorporated a hybrid interpretation for determining admissibility,
wherein the court briefly acknowledges

the "introduction" plain

language of the statute, but then ultimately utilizes the "at issue"
standard's

"specific"
57

or

"affirmative"

language

to

support

admissibility. 1

Courts may further rely on the language of the pleadings or discovery
documents to determine whether the recipient has asserted any issue
pertaining to his or her mental health condition. 15 8 Yet, where a
recipient initially alleges an aspect of his or her condition and then

retracts such an allegation by the time the proceedings commence, the

"at issue" standard has not been met. 15 9 In this respect, an amended
complaint supersedes an initial allegation of discrimination based on
mental illness, and thus the superseded complaint cannot place a
This issue of superseding
recipient's condition "at issue." 160
the
fllinois
Supreme Court's Norskog v.
proceedings was the crux of

response to a question about whether his headaches had gone away, that "them [sic] headaches
have not gone away. I had Dr.-the shrink, I kept accusing him ...." Id. at 1005. Although the
plaintiff-recipient in Reda did not put his mental health affirmatively at issue per se, it could be
argued that he introduced his mental health as it pertained to both liability and damages by
indicating that a portion of his damages may have been the result of his psychiatric medications
rather than defendant's negligence.
157. All such cases wherein the court appears to utilize a hybrid interpretation are discussed
within the "at issue" context because of their ultimate analysis with the more strenuous "at issue"
standards. See, e.g., Reda v. Advocate Health Care, where though the court ultimately concluded
that disclosure was not warranted because the recipient did not "introduce" his condition, it did so
by using language that comports with the "at issue" standards. Reda, 765 N.E.2d at 1009
(holding that the "[recipient] did not place his mental condition at issue merely by claiming
damages for what is a neurological injury"). The same can be said of Mandziara v. Canulli, 701
N.E.2d 127, 133 (LI. App. Ct. 1998), where the court applied the same hybrid language as that
App. Ct. 2000), where the court
seen in Reda, and People v. Gemeny, 731 N.E.2d 844, 851 (I11.
cites to the plain language of section 10(a)(1) and then applies the "at issue" standards
enumerated in Mandziaraand Sassali. See also Chi. Hous. Auth. v. Human Rights Comnn'n, 759
N.E.2d 37, 50-51 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (finding first that the recipient had to introduce his
condition, and then finding that the recipient had not done so utilizing the "at issue" standard);
Bland, 490 N.E.2d at 1333 (noting statutory requirement that the patient introduce his or her
condition, then proceeding to an analysis that only an express or affirmative placement of the
condition "at issue" suffices to waive the privilege).
158. Reda, 765 N.E.2d at 1010 (finding that, because the MHDDCA does not limit disclosure
to that which is contained within the pleadings, "a party may introduce his or her mental
condition in several ways .... e.g., in the pleadings, answers to written discovery, a deposition,
in briefs or motions, in argument before the court, or by stipulation").
In Chicago Housing, the original
159. See Chi. Hous. Auth., 759 N.E.2d at 50-51.
complaining party Lasko brought a complaint against his employer, the Chicago Housing
Authority, alleging discrimination. Id. at 40. The charge originally included an allegation of
discrimination on the basis of Lasko's mental illness, but prior to its adjudication he voluntarily
dismissed that particular allegation. Id. at 42, 51.
160. Id. at51.
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Pfiel decision, 16 1 and underscores the practical implications of utilizing
the "at issue" standard.
In Norskog, the defendants in a wrongful death suit, Roger and Gayle
Pfiel and their son Steven [hereinafter "Pfiels"], refused to disclose
information regarding Steven's mental health diagnosis and
treatment. 162 The procedural history of the case illustrates the complex
legal issue before the court. 16 3 In 1993, Steven, then seventeen, stabbed
Hilary Norskog to death and was charged with her murder. 164 After
pleading not guilty and notifying the parties that he would assert an
insanity defense, the court released Steven on bond. 16 5 While on bond,
Steven murdered his brother and assaulted his sister. 166 Upon his
murder and entered
subsequent arrest, Steven pled guilty to Hilary's
167
into a plea agreement for life imprisonment.

In subsequent civil proceedings, Hilary' s mother, on behalf of herself
and Hilary's estate [hereinafter "Norskogs"], brought various claims
against the Pfiels including claims for negligent supervision and
entrustment based on their failure to properly supervise and control
Steven. 16 8 Both claims required that the Norskogs prove that Steven's
parents knew of Steven's mental instability and to some extent, his
161. See Norskog v. Pfiel, 755 N.E.2d 1, 11-12 (I11.2001) (finding that mental health was not
"at issue" in a prior proceeding where recipient had initially raised an insanity defense to criminal
charges, but later pled guilty).
162. Id. at 4.
163. The procedural posture of this case is also interesting as a result of the fact that the matter
before the Illinois Supreme Court was an evidentiary order: orders which are generally considered
non-final and thus not immediately appealable. Id. at 8; see also People v. Campobello, 810
N.E.2d 307, 313 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (holding that "[g]enerally, nonfinal discovery orders are not
appealable") (citation omitted). Nonetheless, non-final discovery orders are appealable where the
appellants contest the correctness of a contempt sanction for noncompliance with the non-final
discovery order. Id. (citation omitted). Unlike the review of other discovery orders, which
normally grants immense discretion to the trial court by utilizing the abuse of discretion standard,
a review of the applicability of evidentiary privileges requires the court of review to use the de
novo standard. Id. (citing Berry v. W. Suburban Hosp. Med. Ctr., 788 N.E.2d 75, 78 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2003)).
164. Norskog, 755 N.E.2d at 5.
165. Id. It should be noted that the court additionally appointed a psychiatrist "to examine
Steven to determine his fitness to stand trial." Id. The court eventually found, however, that
because the psychiatrist had not specifically mentioned that disclosure may occur in subsequent
civil proceedings and because the code of civil procedure provided for fitness examination
disclosure only where the recipient raised the defense of insanity, "it is reasonable to conclude
that by participating in the court-ordered fitness examinations, Steven agreed to waive his
confidentiality privilege only to the extent provided by the strict procedural rules contained in the
Criminal Code." Id. at 13.
166. Id. at 5.

167. Id.
168. Id.
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propensity for violence. 169 To establish this knowledge, the Norskogs
sought records from the court-ordered psychiatrist, Steven's school
records, and mental health treatment records limited to dates and the
purpose of treatment, any diagnoses, and whether Steven's parents had
received a treatment plan. 170 Steven and his parents claimed
privilege
17 1
under the MHDDCA and refused to disclose the records.
The court held that Steven did not put his mental health at issue

because his guilty plea removed his sanity from being "an issue" in the
criminal case and thus, the plea did not constitute a waiver of the
privilege for either that case or the subsequent civil proceeding. 172 The
court did so even though prior to his guilty plea Steven gave to the
State's Attorney a fifty-seven page report prepared by a retained
medical expert in defense of his insanity.173 Finally, the court held that
unlike in D.C. v. S.A., Steven's mental health records would not by
themselves "establish plaintiffs claims," and accordingly, that the
74
fundamental fairness exception created in D.C. did not apply.'

169. In order to succeed on the claims for negligent entrustment, the Norskogs had to show
that "[defendants] gave [Steven] express or implied permission to use or possess a dangerous
article or instrumentality which [defendants] knew, or should have known, would likely be used
in a manner involving unreasonable risk of harm to others." Evans v. Shannon, 776 N.E.2d 1184,
1190 (111. 2002) (citing Norskog, 755 N.E.2d at 17). Evans also notes that even if an instrument is
not per se dangerous, it may become so "if it is operated by someone who is incompetent,
inexperienced or reckless." Id. Whether the Norskogs could have prevailed on the negligent
supervision claim is a different matter. In order to prevail on such a claim, the Norskogs would
have had to show "that (1) [the Pfiels] were aware of specific instances of prior conduct sufficient
to put them on notice that the act complained of was likely to occur and (2) the [Pfiels] had the
opportunity to control [Steven]." Appelhans v. McFall, 757 N.E.2d 987, 993 (111.App. Ct. 2001).
While it is possible that the Norskogs may not have been able to prove the element of control for
the latter claim, it appears that having the records to potentially show the Pfiels knowledge of
Steven's propensity for violence, and any required parental supervision, would have greatly
improved the Norskogs' odds of prevailing on the negligent entrustment case.
170.

Norskog, 755 N.E.2d at 6.

171. Id.
172. Id. at 12 (holding that "[b]y pleading guilty, then, [his] sanity was no longer an issue").
The variable results produced from the two interpretive methods are exacerbated by the court's
simultaneous use of the "at issue" and "introduction" terminology-though the court concludes
that Steven's insanity was not "at issue," id., it also goes on to conclude that the "initial hurdle" in
10(a)(l) disclosure is that the condition is "introduced." Id. at 14. The court also discussed the
issue of waiver through engagement in a court-ordered psychiatric evaluation to determine fitness
for trial and whether the introduction of the insanity defense could waive the privilege in
subsequent civil proceedings; both questions were answered in the negative. Id. at 13 (finding
that because Steven had not been adequately admonished of the possibility of disclosure in
subsequent civil proceedings, the examination records were not discoverable).
173. Norskog v. Pfiel, 733 N.E.2d 386, 389 n.2 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
174. Norskog, 755 N.E.2d at 17. Though the court utilized this distinction of whether or not
the records would establish the Norskogs' claims in the context of disallowing an extension of
D.C. v. S.A., the court's utilization of an "establish" standard supports the suggestion of this
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b. Introducing an Element under Section 10(a)(1)
As demonstrated by Norskog, the "at issue" standard, and its related
"affirmative" requirement, are both quite strenuous for the proponent of
disclosure to overcome. 175 The application of the "at issue" standard
has directly prohibited disclosure in several other cases. 17 6 In contrast,

of the panoply of cases discussing section 10(a)(1), only a small
percentage consistently apply the standard requiring "introduction" of
the recipient's mental health condition. 177 Among these cases, only a
few allowed the admission of the records because the mental health
resulted in the
condition was actually introduced, 178 and another
79
controversial "fundamental fairness" exception. 1
The Goldberg v. Davis180 decision is instructive in analyzing the
application of the "introduction" standard. The Goldberg decision
followed administrative disciplinary proceedings initiated against a
psychiatrist, and the civil proceeding at issue was between the
81
psychiatrist under review and his past patient's current psychiatrist.'
Comment that the courts have been creating a standard for admission that is more strenuous than
that anticipated by the legislature. See infra Parts 1V.A.3, V (analyzing the Illinois courts' broad
application of the privilege that causes an expansive construction of the section 10(a)(l)
language, and proposing a remedy to return to the plain language of the statute). Moreover, the
Norskog court suggested that the information contained within the records could be obtainable
elsewhere, but points only to the allegations of the Norskogs' complaint to support the statement.
Norskog, 755 N.E.2d at 17 ("Plaintiffs complaint contains factual allegations which, if proven,
would support her claim that the Pfiels knew or should have known that Steven was a danger to
others. Plaintiffs arguments before this court belie the need for disclosure of privileged
information.").
175. See supra note 91 and accompanying text (discussing cases that describe section 10(a)(1)
as having created a "formidable challenge" to disclosure).
176. See supra note 142 (listing cases that utilize the "at issue" standard to assess
admissibility of mental health records).
177. See D.C. v. S.A., 687 N.E.2d 1032, 1039 (Il. 1997) ("[D]enial of any contributory
negligence . . . does not by itself . . . result in the introduction by plaintiff of his mental
condition."); Goldberg v. Davis, 602 N.E.2d 812, 817 (Ill. 1992) (utilizing the "introduction"
language to allow admission); Laurent v. Brelji, 392 N.E.2d 929, 932 (IlI. App. Ct. 1979)
(interpreting section 10(a)(1) based on the "introduction" standard).
178. See, e.g., Goldberg, 602 N,E.2d at 817 (finding that "[the recipient] has introduced her
mental condition as well as services received"); Laurent, 392 N.E.2d at 931-32 (holding that the
"[recipient], incident to an administrative proceeding, introduced an aspect of the services he
received for his mental condition (the alleged abuse by Laurent)").
179. See D.C., 687 N.E.2d at 1039-41 (holding that although the recipient's mental condition
was not per se introduced in his claim, fundamental fairness required disclosure of records in part
because they would have entirely foreclosed defendant's liability); see also supra notes 120-32
and accompanying text (discussing D.C. v. S.A. and the fundamental fairness exception).
180. Goldberg, 602 N.E.2d at 812.
181. Id. at 813-16. Defendant-appellant Dr. Goldberg, the physician under investigation in
the disciplinary proceedings, sought records from his former patient's current psychiatrist, Dr.
Davis, for an in camera inspection for use in the disciplinary proceeding. Id. at 813. Dr. Davis
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The disciplinary board initiated proceedings against Dr. Goldberg after
the patient alleged that Dr. Goldberg had engaged in improper sexual
conduct during the course of treatment. 182 On interlocutory appeal, the
Illinois Supreme Court found that, as the complaining witness to the

disciplinary proceedings, the recipient had satisfied the section 10(a)(1)
services received for
standard because she had introduced aspects of8the
3
her condition into the disciplinary proceeding.]
To substantiate his defense, however, Dr. Goldberg sought expansive

records for the majority of the recipient's psychiatric history in order to
prove that the patient's allegations derived from a psychotic
transference. 184 The court agreed with Dr. Goldberg that disclosure was
appropriate, finding that the issue of whether sexual conduct had

occurred relied on the patient's specific psychiatric history, which may
have included episodes of psychotic transference. 185 Accordingly, the
court held that an in camera inspection of her psychiatric records was
"imperative" and that without such an inspection, the court "c[ould not]
do justice to any of the parties."' 186 In contrast to the cases using the "at
issue" standard, however, the patient-recipient never "specifically" or

"affirmatively" placed her condition "at issue" or made any claim for

mental loss. 187

Rather, she merely placed the allegation of sexual

filed an interlocutory appeal after the circuit court had ordered her to produce those records for in
camera inspection. Id.
182. In the disciplinary proceedings, Dr. Davis refused to turn over her treatment records
sought by Dr. Goldberg. Id.
183. Id. at 817-19.
184. Id. at 818-19. Dr. Goldberg sought disclosure of the recipient's past records and asserted
that because the patient had a history of psychotic transferences, her allegation of sexual
misconduct and memories associated therewith were a result of a psychotic transference rather
than his actual misconduct. Id.
185. The court went to great lengths to describe the nature and history of the patient's specific
illness to support its final conclusion that the records were pertinent to the disposition of the case.
Id. at 817-18. This analysis was encouraged by the varying testimony of the two psychiatrists:
Dr. Goldberg argued that the patient had a "severe borderline personality," whereas Dr. Davis
argued that the patient had "only a mild form of borderline personality disorder." Id. at 817.
Both doctors agreed that transference had indeed occurred, but Dr. Goldberg believed it was not
based on reality while Dr. Davis believed it was based on reality. Id. at 818. The court defined
transference as: "the primarily unconscious tendency of an individual to assign to others in the
present those feelings and attitudes originally connected with significant figures during the course
of early development." Id. (citation omitted).
186. Id. at 817-20. The court goes to some length exploring the rationale for this decision,
and it appears to be primarily based upon the nature of borderline personality disorder as it
pertains to episodes of "psychotic transference." Id. at 817-18. Thus, as Dr. Goldberg asserted
the defense of the patient's psychotic transference, the records of the patient's treatment history
became particularly pertinent in determining whether the conduct in fact occurred or if such
beliefs were not based on reality. Id. at 818.
187. Though the patient did introduce an aspect of her treatment history in that she asserted
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misconduct at issue-which was tangentially related to the services
received for that condition-but it was Dr. Goldberg's defense that
resulted in the court's approval
of very broad discovery into the
88
recipient's psychiatric history. 1
Laurent v. Brelji, a case decided shortly after the MHDDCA's
promulgation, also illustrates the distinction between the "introduction"
and "at issue" standards. 189 In Laurent, patient-recipient L.S. testified
at an administrative discharge proceeding brought by the Civil Service
Commission against Dr. Laurent. 190 L.S. testified that Dr. Laurent had
harassed and abused him. 19 1 Finding that L.S.'s testimony was
sufficient to introduce his condition or aspects of the services received,
192
the Laurent court allowed disclosure of L.S.'s mental health records.
The court reasoned that because the term "claim" in the MHDDCA is

sexual misconduct during her therapeutic relationship with the defendant physician, her condition
and the services received for her condition were not per se at issue in either proceeding. Instead,
the sexual misconduct that was at issue, with the patient's expansive psychiatric history only
related to the defendant's defenses. Id. at 818. Under the "at issue" standard, it could also be
argued that because her services were at the center of the controversy, they were indeed at issue.
Nonetheless, using the rules from myriad cases applying the "at issue" standard, the plaintiffrecipient's commencement of disciplinary proceedings for sexual misconduct would be
insufficient to support disclosure because the plaintiff-recipient did not "affirmatively" or
"specifically" place her condition "at issue" or assert a claim for mental loss; furthermore, her
extensive and entire psychiatric history arose only as an element of the physician's defense. See
supra notes 147-60 and accompanying text (discussing the courts' application of the "at issue"
standard).
188. Goldberg, 602 N.E.2d at 816-20 (allowing the production of twelve years of the patientrecipient's psychiatric records for an in camera inspection).
189. Laurent v. Brelji, 392 N.E.2d 929, 932 (111. App. Ct. 1979).
190. Laurent, 392 N.E.2d at 930. After the testimony of the patient, defendant Laurent had
served a subpoena duces tecum on Dr. Brelji, the patient, L.S.'s, current physician. Id. Dr. Brejli
filed a motion to quash the subpoena which the administrative disciplinary hearing officer
subsequently denied. Id. Dr. Laurent and the commission on his behalf then sought judicial
review of the decision, and the circuit court entered an order directing Dr. Brejli to produce the
requested records for an in camera hearing. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 932. In so holding, the court reasoned that "th[e] case provid[ed] a keen example
of an instance where the balance of competing values falls on the side of disclosure." Id. This
was because the "facts and issues before the investigating body relate[d] directly to the witness'
hospitalization.., incident in question specifically arose out of the hospitalization... [and] [tihe
respondent ... would necessarily know the identity of the witness." Id. The Laurent court was
also sure to confirm that its decision "in no manner implie[d] that a person, merely by presenting
himself as a witness, must run the risk of having his entire mental history drug out and exposed
before a public hearing for the ostensible purpose of questioning his perceptive capabilities." Id.
at 932-33. This reasoning supports the suggestion of this Comment that compliance with the
plain language of the statute will not result in the unwarranted disclosure of mental health records
for improper purposes. See also infra Part V.B (proposing that the Illinois courts return to an
interpretation of the MHDDCA based in part on traditional doctrines of statutory construction).
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"not synonymous with cause of action," it was irrelevant that the
93
proceeding occurred in an administrative instead of judicial capacity.1
2. Prongs Two and Three: The Forgotten Protections
Almost all of the cases applying the MHDDCA within the context of

section 10(a)(1) stop the discussion after finding that the proponent of
admission has met--or more likely, has failed to meet-the first
prong. 194 As a result, it is unclear how the courts would assess
1 95
evidentiary admissibility under the second prong of section 10(a)(1).
This aspect is particularly important because, even after the court finds
the proponent or recipient to have satisfied the first prong of introducing
his or her condition or aspects of the services received, the court must
still make a finding that the proposed evidence "is relevant, probative,

not unduly prejudicial
' 196

or inflammatory,

and otherwise clearly

admissible."

Under the third prong of section 10(a)(1), the proponent of admission
must also show that the other evidence is "demonstrably
unsatisfactory"

19 7

and that the proposed admission serves the interests

193. Laurent, 392 N.E.2d at 932.
194. See, e.g., Reda v. Advocate Health Care, 765 N.E.2d 1002, 1009-11 (111. 2002) (not
discussing second prong); Chi. Hous. Auth. v. Human Rights Comm'n, 759 N.E.2d 37, 51 (ill.
App. Ct. 2001) (finding that even if records were admissible, defendant failed to show that
administrative law judge "made the specific and necessary findings that section 10(a)(1) requires
before mental health evidence can be allowed"); Sassali v. Rockford Mem'l Hosp., 693 N.E.2d
1287, 1290 (iIl. App. Ct. 1998) (finding only that trial court did not make the required findings
under the second and third prongs, not the way in which the trial court would make such
findings); Mandziara v. Canulli, 701 N.E.2d 127, 133 (il. App. Ct. 1998) (criticizing the trial
court for rendering records admissible without considering the evidentiary admissibility under the
second prong or weighing recipient's privacy interests against substantial justice); People v.
Phipps, 424 N.E.2d 727, 730 (iIl. App. Ct. 1981) (stopping analysis after finding defendant's
right to confront was stronger than privilege). Though the court in Goldberg discussed the
requirements of the second prong, it did so within the context of establishing the importance of
the in camera inspection of the records to determine whether the records were unduly prejudicial,
inflammatory, and their probative value on the issue of whether the transference had occurred.
Goldberg v. Davis, 602 N.E.2d 812, 819 (II. 1992). Additionally, because the Norskog court
held that the Norskogs had not satisfied the burden of the first prong of section 10(a)(1), the court
did not reach the issue of whether the evidence would otherwise be admissible except for its
allusion to the fact that "such broad discovery orders would be unwarranted [even if the court
found the fundamental fairness exception to apply]." Norskog v. Pfiel, 755 N.E.2d 1, 17-18 (I11.
2001). But see D.C. v. S.A., 687 N.E.2d 1032, 1041 (ill. 1997) (finding records were relevant,
probative, admissible, not unduly prejudicial, and not obtainable elsewhere).
195. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT 110/10(a)(1) (2008).
196. Id.
197. Id.; see also Goldberg, 602 N.E.2d at 819 (showing existing evidence met the
"demonstrably unsatisfactory" requirement because the only existing evidence was testimony of
the psychiatrists and patient, and "[w]ithout further evidence, i.e., past therapy, experiences, etc.,
the evidence is unsatisfactory").
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of substantial justice and outweighs any potential injury that might
result from disclosure. 198 This may include establishing that there are
compelling interests in support of production. 19 9 Again, however,
because most of the decisions on point foreclose the opportunity for

disclosure at the first prong of section 10(a)(1), the courts have largely
left unresolved how they would assess the evidentiary value of mental
health records once they pass through the first prong. Nonetheless, it is
clear that the findings must always be made, and disclosure is not
appropriate where the court only finds that the first prong has been
200
satisfied.
3.

20
Alternate Admissibility: Waivers

1

The courts have additionally established that a recipient can satisfy

the section 10(a)(1) exception by waiving his or her privilege, although

198. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT I10/10(a)(1) (2008) (requiring the court to find that "disclosure is
more important to the interests of substantial justice than protection from injury to the therapistrecipient relationship or to the recipient or other whom disclosure is likely to harm").
199. Laurent v. Brelji, 392 N.E.2d 929, 933 (I11.App. Ct. 1979). In a case of first impression,
the Illinois Supreme Court has additionally held that the MHDDCA applies retroactively, and
thus, the privilege covers records "created prior to the effective dates of the statutes." Wisniewski
v. Kownacki, 851 N.E.2d 1243, 1249 (Il1. 2006).
200. See infra note 326 and accompanying text (citing to cases wherein the court's failure to
reach the findings required by the second and third prongs of 10(a)(l) was dispositive of the
propriety of disclosure).
201. A variety of cases also discuss the application of the MHDDCA within the context of
establishing or testing a witness's credibility, particularly because case law suggests that a
witness's mental condition is relevant for purposes of impeachment or credibility. See People v.
Williams, 588 N.E.2d 983, 1008 (111.1991) ("[E]vidence of a witness' mental health history... is
relevant as it relates to credibility, and is thus a permissible area of impeachment, [but] before
such evidence may be introduced its relevance must be established."); People v. Hogan, 904
N.E.2d 1036, 1046-47 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) ("[I]n determining credibility of a witness or the
weight to be accorded to his [or her] testimony, regard is generally given to [the witness's] mental
condition. Almost any emotional or mental defect may materially affect the accuracy of
testimony.") (quotation omitted); People v. Plummer, 743 N.E.2d 170, 179 (III. App. Ct. 2000)
(citation omitted) (noting that a witness's mental health history is a permissible area of
impeachment); People v. Dace, 449 N.E.2d 1031, 1035 (I11.App. Ct. 1983) (holding that when a
court is "[c]onfronted with articulable evidence that raises a reasonable inquiry of a witness's
mental health history, [it] should permit a defendant to discover that history"). This issue is
complicated by the fact that, in criminal cases, the need to protect confidentiality must be
balanced with the defendant's constitutional right to cross examination of adverse witnesses.
Roberts v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 593 N.E.2d 1144, 1157 (I11.App. Ct. 1992) (Cook, J.,
concurring) (citing People v. Bean, 560 N.E.2d 258, 273-74 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)) ("In criminal
cases the public policy in maintaining the confidentiality of mental health records is subordinate
to a defendant's constitutional right to effectively cross-examine an adverse witness to show
bias."); see also People v. Phipps, 424 N.E.2d 727, 730 (111. App. Ct. 1981) ("When . . . a
statutory evidentiary privilege comes in direct conflict with the defendant's constitutional rights
of confrontation and due process, we hold that the former must give way so that the fundamental
protections of our criminal justice system will not be abrogated.").
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This
only limited situations trigger the waiver's application. 20 2
principle is congruent with the idea that the MHDDCA is designed as "a
shield. ' 20 3 Thus, though section 10(a)(1) does not expressly set forth
that a party waives the privilege by introducing records protected by the
MHDDCA,2° the courts have held that a waiver occurs where the
recipient satisfies the criteria for disclosure under an "at issue" or
"introduction" standard 20 5 or permits disclosure. 20 6 Moreover, a waiver
in one proceeding may constitute a waiver in subsequent proceedings,
and a waiver as to one physician will waive the privilege for all other
physicians treating the recipient for the same condition. 20 7 This waiver
defense and calling a medical
generally includes alleging an insanity
20 8
expert to trial to support the defense.
The definition of a prior proceeding, however, complicates the
waiver issue. 20 9 As section 10(a) states, a prior proceeding consists of
both a civil, criminal, or "other proceedings" and any proceedings
"preliminary thereto." 2 10 The courts, however, have construed the term
"proceeding" strictly against the party seeking admission. 2 11 The
2001).
202. Norskog v. Pfiel, 755 N.E.2d 1, 14 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2000) ("Fundamental
203. Id. at 16; People v. Gemeny, 731 N.E.2d 844, 852 (Ill.
fairness ... does not require that defendant surrender his statutory privilege" where defendant is
not using statute "as a sword.").
204. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT 110/10 (2008).
205. See supra Part IIl.B.1.b (discussing application of "introduction" standard in various
Illinois cases).
206. See, e.g., Novak v. Rantham, 478 N.E.2d 1334, 1337-38 (Ill. 1985) (noting that if
disclosure occurs or the recipient permits disclosure, "the privilege is waived and cannot be
reasserted"); see also People v. Leggans, 625 N.E.2d 1133, 1139 (I1. App. Ct. 1993) ("[Flailure
to contemporaneously object and specifically include the issue [of improper disclosure] in a posttrial motion results in waiver of the issue on appeal.").
207. Novak, 478 N.E.2d at 1337 (noting that a waiver as to one physician constitutes a waiver
as to another physician). But cf Norskog, 755 N.E.2d at 12 (finding that waiver as to privilege in
criminal determination of fitness to stand trial did not waive the privilege in the subsequent civil
proceeding). A separate but related point is whether a provider can waive the privilege. See
generally House v. SwedishAmerican Hosp., 564 N.E.2d 922 (Il. App. Ct. 1990) (discussing
waiver in the context of section 3(a) definition).
208. Novak, 478 N.E.2d at 1337 (observing that "a waiver at a former trial should bar a claim
of the privilege at a later trial") (citation omitted).
209. This is so because many of the cases discussing the application of section 10(a)(1) do so
in the context of whether the defendant has waived his or her privilege to confidentiality because
of the introduction of records in, what the proponent of admission considers, a "prior
proceeding." See, e.g., Chi. Hous. Auth. v. Human Rights Comm'n, 759 N.E.2d 37, 51 (111.App.
Ct. 2001) (finding administrative hearing insufficient forum for waiver because by the time the
hearing began, the recipient's amended complaint no longer asserted discrimination based on
mental illness).
210. 740 ILL.COMP.STAT 110/10(a) (2008).
211. See, e.g., Norskog, 755 N.E.2d at 13; People v. Gemeny, 731 N.E.2d 844, 850 (111. App.
Ct. 2000) (finding limited disclosure in sentencing phase of domestic violence case did not result
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Norskog decision-where the defendant's intentional introduction of a

detailed insanity defense was insufficient to trigger section 10(a)(1)'s
exception for disclosure-exemplifies this strict application of the
section 10(a)(1) waiver. 2 12 Nonetheless, where the court is unclear as to
the existence of a waiver, the recipient's expectation of confidentiality
can be outcome determinative as to whether any such waiver
2 13
occurred.
IV. ANALYSIS

As the preceding Parts demonstrate, the exceptions to the
MHDDCA's privilege are perceived to be "very narrow" and as a result,
courts express great discomfort at requests for disclosure. 2 14 Indeed, as
Part Ill demonstrated, the courts have predominantly applied a standard
of admissibility that is far more strenuous than that anticipated by the
legislature, requiring an "affirmative" placement of one's condition "at
issue." 2 15 Taken as a whole, however, section 10(a)(1) creates a much
2 16
less strenuous standard of admission, that of mere "introduction."
Thus, it appears that the courts have departed from the plain language of
the statute by broadly applying the privilege and expansively construing
section 10(a)(1)'s "introduction" language to include "at issue" as
well. 2 17 This construction has skewed the courts' ability to maintain the
in the defense's right to involuntary disclosure of the records in a subsequent case). The court in
Gemeny also relied on the fact that the defendant had not consented to the treatment because it
was court ordered. Gemeny, 731 N.E.2d at 850.
212. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (discussing Norskog court's rationale for
excluding psychiatric records on the basis that no waiver occurred when the recipient asserted his
insanity defense).
213. Sangirardi v. Vill. of Stickney, 793 N.E.2d 787, 799 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (citing Scott v.
Edinburg, 101 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1020 (N.D. 111.2000)). This was dispositive for the plaintiff in
Sangirardi, for the court held that because plaintiff was a police officer and therefore had "no
reasonable expectation that the results of his fitness exam would be kept confidential from [his
Chiefi," the officer could not assert the privilege in precluding his Chief Officer from obtaining
said results. Id. at 799; cf McGreal v. Ostrov, 368 F.3d 657, 686-88 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that
because officer's consent to disclosure was signed under duress, though the MHDDCA did not
provide an exception for disclosure with respect to police departments and mental health fitness
examinations, the consent form was insufficient to allow disclosure in face of the intent of the
MHDDCA to "restrict disclosure to that which is necessary to accomplish a particular purpose").
It is notable that the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated in McGreal that the
Sangiardidecision was "in tension with Norskog." McGreal, 368 F.3d at 690.
214. 11 ILL. PRACTICE SERIES, COURTROOM HANDBOOK ON ILL. EvID. § 503.5, at 2 (2009
ed.) (citing Chi. Hous. Auth., 759 N.E.2d at 51; Sassali v. Rockford Mem'l Hosp., 693 N.E.2d
1287, 1289 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)).
215. See supra Part III.B.1.a (discussing application of "at issue" standard in Illinois courts).
216. See supra Parts HI.A.1-3 (discussing sections and definitions of the MHDDCA and
section 10(a)(1)).
217. See supra Parts Im.A.3, III.B.1 (highlighting specific text of section 10(a)(1) and
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apparent legislative intent, namely disclosure when the interests of
substantial justice so require 2 18 and avoidance of an absolute prohibition
2 19
against disclosure.
To discuss the propriety of the Illinois courts' application of the "at
issue" versus "introduction" standard, this Part will analyze both the "at
issue" and "introduction" standards as they generally apply in the
judicial context. 220 This Part will then discuss the effects of the variable
interpretive methods applied by the Illinois courts. 2 2 1 Here, particular
emphasis will be placed on how the courts' departure from the
"introduction" standard has precluded disclosure of records in cases in
222
which the statute's plain language appears to allow for disclosure.

discussing the Illinois cases apparently deviating from the plain language of section 10(a)(l)).
218. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT I 10/10(a)(1) (2008). The term "substantial justice" is relied on in
myriad judicial settings. See, e.g., Hanson v. DeKalb County State's Attorney's Office, 909
N.E.2d 903, 909-10 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (using the substantial justice standard to determine the
propriety of a Department proceeding pertaining to the plaintiff's right to possess a firearm);
Jackson v. Bailey, 893 N.E.2d 280, 283 (111.App. Ct. 2008) ("Whether substantial justice is being
achieved ... is not subject to precise definition, but relevant considerations include diligence or
the lack thereof, the existence of a meritorious defense, the severity of the penalty resulting from
the order or judgment, and the relative hardships on the parties."); Gordon v. Gordon, 887 N.E.2d
35, 38 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)) (using the
concept of substantial justice to determine the propriety of the court's exercise, or lack thereof, of
personal jurisdiction over the defendant); People v. Cearlock, 887 N.E.2d 893, 902 (111.App. Ct.
2008) (citation omitted) (citing to trial court's discretion to declare a mistrial when, according to
the trial judge, substantial justice cannot be obtained without discontinuing the trial); Morgan v.
Dep't of Fin. & Prof'l Regulation, 871 N.E.2d 178, 188 (I11.App. Ct. 2007) (using the concept of
substantial justice within the context of a professional Director's discretion to determine the
propriety of an administrative decision regarding defendant's ability to maintain his professional
licensure); Trossman v. Philipsborn, 869 N.E.2d 1147, 1172 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (citing to the
statute and noting that "pleadings are to be liberally construed to do substantial justice between
the parties"); Deutsche Bank Nat'l v. Burtley, 861 N.E.2d 1075, 1080 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006)
(applying the "substantial justice" standard to determine the propriety of the district court's
decision to deny a motion to vacate for an abuse of discretion and implying that substantial justice
includes whether an end result is just or fair).
219. This intent is evidenced by the legislature's inclusion of instances in which the propriety
of non-consensual disclosure outweighs the individual right to confidentiality. See supra note 97
and accompanying text (citing to cases that note that the MHDDCA privilege is not absolute); see
also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 89, at 5 (noting that "several new exceptions" were added
to the proposed revision of confidentiality laws).
220. See infra Parts IV.A.1-2 (analyzing the "at issue" versus "introduction" standards).
221. See infra Part 1V.A.3 (utilizing general definitions of "at issue" and "introduction" to
analyze the Illinois court's different interpretive methods).
222. See infra Part tV.A.3 (discussing the potential outcome of past cases if the introduction
standard had been applied).
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Elements of the Recipient's Claim or Defense: "At Issue" Versus
"Introduction"

To illustrate the cognizable distinctions between the "at issue" and
"introduction" standards, this section will first briefly discuss the "at
issue" and "introduction" standards as they apply outside the context of
the MHiDDCA. 22 3 Then, this section will contrast the application of the
"at issue" and "introduction" standards to prove the superiority of the
22 4
"introduction" standard.
1. Placing an Element "At Issue," Generally
In order to explore the propriety of the Illinois courts' application of
the "at issue" standard, a brief discussion of the "at issue" doctrine in
other contexts is required. First, the plain definition of "at issue"
encompasses anything that is "in dispute" or "at variance." 2 25 There are
varying descriptions of "at issue" in case law, including that an element
is not "at issue" where nothing has been said with respect to that
issue, 2 26 but also that where there is a dispute pertaining to an element,
it is "at issue." 227 Precedent suggests that it is the latter definition that
is controlling, namely something is "at issue" if it is a central part of the

controversy in question. 228

Moreover, in the criminal context an

"element" to a claim constitutes anything that "negatives an excuse for
the conduct at issue;" 22 9 this suggests that in the hierarchy of procedural
assertions, something that is "at issue" earns a more highly controversial
position than something that is merely introduced as an element of such

223. See infra Parts IV.A.1-2 (analyzing the "at issue" and "introduction" standards
independent of the MHDDCA).
224. See infra Part IV.A.3 (detailing the effect of utilizing the introduction standards).
225. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 383 (3d pocket ed., 1996) [hereinafter BLACK'S] ("[l]ssue:
A point in dispute between two or more parties."); OXFORD AM. DICTIONARY 419 (1999).
226. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 746 (2006) (finding dissent's reliance on
definition of an element/issue from a prior case was improper where the prior case did not place
the element "at issue" because the decision "said nothing" about the issue). In so holding, the
Court noted that it was "wholly implausible" that the prior case controlled Rapanos because the
particular definition before the Court was not "at issue" in the prior case because nothing was said
about it. Id.
227. See supra Part IH.B.I.a (discussing "at issue" standards of admissibility under the
MHDDCA).
228. See Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 12-13 (2006) (discussing "at issue" in the
context of the specific statutory crimes alleged to have been committed by defendant); Nike, Inc.
v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 663 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring) (describing speech that is crux of
controversy as that which is "at issue"); see also BLACK'S, supra note 225, at 383 ("[l]ssue: A
point in dispute between two or more parties."); supra note 12 and accompanying text (citing to
Shafer v. South Carolina and discussion regarding "at issue").
229. Dixon, 541 U.S. at 16 (citing ALl, MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(9)(c) (2001)).
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an assertion. This further indicates that simply introducing something
as a partial element of a claim or defense involves less affirmative

behavior than, at a later time, legally proving each of the required
elements of a cause of action or defense or even per se alleging that
2 30
specific claim or defense.
2. Introducing an Element, Generally
In contrast to the "at issue" standard,2 3 1 in plain language to

"introduce" something means to "make known," "announce or present,"
or "bring into use." 232 Though the precise definition of the
"introduction" standard in the judicial context is somewhat unclear due
to a dearth of decisions directly on point, the United States Supreme

Court has recognized that there is in fact a cognizable difference
between merely introducing an element and affirmatively placing such
2 33
element "at issue."
The Fourth District Illinois Appellate Court has also articulated that
there is a distinction specifically with respect to the MHDDCA by
noting that the privilege created by the MHDDCA may be waived either

by introducing one's mental health condition or placing this condition at
issue. 234 Indeed, intuition suggests that merely introducing an element
is not the same as affirmatively placing the element at issue-the former

requires only a suggestion of relevancy or admissibility. 235 In contrast,
to affirmatively place an element directly "at issue" in a cause of action
or defense requires that the element in question have concrete legal
substantiation. 236 This is a higher standard than the introduction

230. See infra note 236 and accompanying text (discussing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11
which defines the legal substantiation required in pleadings).
231. See supra Part W.A. I (discussing the "at issue" standard).
232. OXFORD AM. DICTIONARY 415 (1999); see also, e.g., BLACK'S, supra note 225, at 380
("[I]ntroduce into evidence: To have (a fact or object) admitted into the trial record, allowing it to
be considered.., in reaching a decision").
233. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing Shafer v. South Carolina decision
in which the Supreme Court delineated the distinction between the "at issue" and "introduction"
standards).
234. Roberts v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 593 N.E.2d 1144, 1153 (I11.App. Ct. 1992) (finding
that the defendant "suggests [recipient] has waived this privilege by introducing his mental
condition.., this privilege can also be waived by placing one's mental condition in issue").
235. See also infra notes 275-77 (discussing broad relevancy for discovery and need for
liberal discovery).
236. This idea is confirmed through the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the established
requirements for pleading a cause of action, and the sanctions associated with filing documents
with the court for which there is no legally established basis. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (b):
By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper-whether by
signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it-an attorney or unrepresented party
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standard described above, especially considering the broad definition of
237
relevancy during non-pleading periods such as discovery.
3. Effect of Using the "Introduction" Standard
As the preceding sets forth, the distinction between the "at issue" and
"introduction" standards is meaningful, nuanced, and cognizable,
particularly within the MHDDCA and section 10(a)(1). 2 38 The critical
evaluation, though, is how the cases applying section 10(a)(1) would
change if the Illinois courts were to apply the "introduction" standard.
This section seeks to assess those changes.
In Norskog and cases similarly using an expansive construction of the
"introduction" language to include the "at issue" standard,2 3 9 precluding
disclosure after an analysis of only the first prong of section 10(a)(1)
was dispositive of some aspect of the claim. 240 Several cases have
followed this incomplete approach, and Norskog epitomizes the danger
of broadly applying the privilege beyond the statute's plain language.
In Norskog, defendant Steven clearly introduced his condition by not
only asserting the insanity defense, but also by retaining an expert
witness to assess his mental health and submitting to his opponent a
substantial document supporting his insanity. 241 The court was correct
that after his plea Steven's mental health was no longer "at issue" in the
case. 2 42 But it is difficult to conceive of how Steven's explicit and
detailed insanity defense was insufficient to "introduce" his condition.
The confusing application of section 10(a)(1) in the court's decision is
exacerbated by the fact that the statute's plain language provides that
introducing the recipient's condition can occur both at a proceeding and

certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed
after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: ... (2) the claims, defenses, and
other legal contentions are warranted by existing law ....
Id.
237. See infra notes 275-77 and accompanying text (discussing definitions of relevancy
during discovery and trial).
238. See supra Parts IV.A. 1-2 (discussing "at issue" and "introduction" standards generally)
and supra Part IH.B. 1 (analyzing in depth the Goldberg and Norskog decisions and their relative
importance with respect to the application of the two standards).
239. See supra Part II.B.1.a (analyzing cases applying the "at issue" standard).
240. See infra note 326 and accompanying text (discussing cases for which the failure to reach
the second and third prongs of section 10(a)(l) affected the appellate court's determination of the
propriety of disclosure/lack of disclosure in the trial court).
241. See supra note 173 and accompanying text (noting document submitted in support of
Steven's insanity defense).
242. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (citing to Norskog court's decision that
Steven's plea of guilty absolved him from ever having put his mental health at issue).
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in any preceding proceeding, 243 and subsequent cases have found that

"preceding proceeding" can include discovery and other documents
244
submitted to the courts.

Under a literal application of the "introduction" standard, then, it is

highly likely that the requested records would have been admissible.
This is particularly so because plaintiffs were not engaging in a "fishing
expedition" for inflammatory information, nor would the statute even
24 5
allow the discovery of the psychotherapist's personal notes.
Plaintiffs sought information specific to defendant's liability, and their
failure to receive this information was likely dispositive to those
claims. 24 6 Moreover, unlike Chicago Housing, where the plaintiffrecipient retracted his claim for mental suffering, 24 7 Steven never
retracted his insanity defense but instead plead guilty only after
24 8 Lastly, using Laurent's rationale, 24 9
committing his second murder.
Steven's mental health was well known to both parties as Steven had
made his intent to plea insanity, and his mental illness, very clear. Thus
the policy reasons to preclude disclosure to avoid stigmatization no
longer existed, and the court's utilization of the "at issue" instead of

243. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/10(a) (2008).
244. See supra note 158 and accompanying text (discussing Reda decision that established
definitions of "preceding proceeding" as it applies to proceedings through which the privilege can
be waived).
245. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/3 (2008). This fear of "fishing expeditions" existed prior to
the promulgation of the MHDDCA. See, e.g., Tylitzki v. Triple X Serv., Inc., 261 N.E.2d 533,
536 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970) (holding that the "extension of defendant's argument is to urge that
whenever a plaintiff who has been under psychiatric care testifies at a trial, the defendant should
be allowed to call the plaintiffs psychiatrist to the stand ... [to] give a detailed analysis of the
plaintiffs mental condition").
246. Norskog v. Pfiel, 755 N.E.2d 1, 5 n.2 (Ill. 2001) ("Among the numerous factual
allegations contained in the amended complaint, plaintiff claimed 'on information and belief' that
Steven began receiving 'professional psychiatric treatment' at the age of nine ... [p]laintiff seeks
to verify this and other allegations through discovery."). This suggests that plaintiffs did not in
fact have sufficient evidence to prove those allegations by the standards required at trial, and thus
the need in the first place to discover such records. See also supra note 169 and accompanying
text (discussing Norskog's burden of proof and persuasion on their claims for negligent
entrustment and negligent supervision, both of which required proof of the element of
knowledge).
247. Chi. Hous. Auth. v. Human Rights Comm'n, 759 N.E.2d 37, 51 (111.App. Ct. 2001)
(finding mental health not at issue because the "[recipient] did assert a claim that involved his
mental health, but he amended the charge and withdrew the claim completely long before the
cause was even addressed").
248. Norskog, 755 N.E.2d at 5 ("Initially, Steven pleaded not guilty ... and gave notice that
he would assert an insanity defense . . . . Thereafter [the subsequent murder of his brother],
Steven entered into a negotiated plea agreement.").
249. See supra notes 189-93 and accompanying text (discussing the Laurent decision and its
implications for the "introduction" standard).
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"introduction" standard undermined the enumerated goal of section
10(a)(1) to disclose records where the condition has been introduced.2 5 °
Additionally, under a strict application of the "at issue" test, the
plaintiff in D.C. v. S.A. would have been able not only to recover
damages based on the defendant's alleged negligence, but also to
stigmatize defendant with liability on a negligence action. 25 1 Though
the propriety of the "fundamental fairness" exception carved out by

D.C. v. S.A. is controversial for many reasons, 252 the court may not have
needed to reach that determination by going beyond the plain language
because section 10(a)(1)'s plain language would have likely allowed
admission. D.C. introduced his condition by putting opposing counsel
on notice, even if inadvertently, that he may have been attempting
suicide at the time of the accident, 2 53 thus meeting the requirement that
the condition be introduced during the proceedings. 2 54 Counsel was not
seeking the information for undue prejudice or inflammatory effect, and
2 55
surely it was relevant to the case as it absolved S.A. of liability.
Under "at issue," though, because D.C. did not "affirmatively" place his

250. See supra Part HI.A.3 (discussing section 10(a)(1) and the three-pronged test for
admissibility).
251. See supra notes 120-26 and accompanying text (discussing D.C. v. S.A. and noting that
plaintiff had brought a personal injury suit predicated on the negligence of the defendant, though
it later was discovered that plaintiff himself was the cause of the accident).
252. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (discussing amicus briefs filed in Norskog
that underscored recipient's fear of unwarranted disclosure as a result of the D.C. decision). The
decision may also be controversial because it is an example of "legislating from the bench" in that
the court created an exception that was not contemplated nor enumerated by the legislature;
"legislating from the bench" refers to a judicially created exception that the plain language of a
statute does not proscribe. See Bruce G. Peabody, Legislatingfrom the Bench: A Definitionand a
Defense, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 185, 200-02 (2007) (describing various definitions of
"legislating from the bench"). It is also often used by political candidates to tout their judicial
ideologies and dictate the extent to which the courts should be allowed to engage in "judicial
policy making." Jeffrey Rosen, What's Wrong With Legislatingfrom the Bench?, TIME, July 16,
2009, http://www.time.comtime/politics/article/0,8599,1910714,00.html
(citing then-Supreme
Court Justice nominee Sonia Sotomayor) ("The duty of a judge is to follow the law, not to
question its plain terms . . . I trust that Congress would prefer to make any needed changes itself,
rather than have courts do so for it."); Posting of Andante Higgins to CBS News Blogs,
http://www.cbsnews.comlblogs/2008/02/11 l/politics/fromtheroad/entry3819847.shtml (Feb. 11,
2008, 21:16 EST) (citing Presidential Nominee John McCain) (describing McCain's campaign
statement regarding Supreme Court nominees: "I tell you I will nominate only people who have a
clear, complete adherence to the Constitution of the United States and do not legislate from the
bench").
253. D.C. v. S.A., 687 N.E.2d 1032, 1035 (Il. 1997).
254. See also supra note 158 and accompanying text (discussing the Reda court's
acknowledgement that a prior proceeding includes pleadings and discovery).
255. D.C., 687 N.E.2d at 1041 ("[T]he information plaintiff seeks to protect potentially
contradicts his assertion that defendants were negligent and caused the accident. The information
has the potential to completely absolve defendants from any liability.").
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condition "at issue," disclosure was not proper under that standard and
because disclosure seemed imperative, the court had to create an
rejected by subsequent
alternative standard that has basically been
25 6
courts attempting to apply section 10(a)(1).
Sassali v. Rockford Memorial Hospitalis another case that may have
turned out differently if the court had applied the "introduction"
standard. In Sassali, the plaintiff-recipient Sassali sought to refute
allegations of mental instability when the defendant-hospital Rockford
2 57
Memorial initiated involuntary commitment proceedings against her.
Nonetheless, the court found that because Sassali had not
"affirmatively" placed her condition at issue, she did not waive the
privilege. 25 8 The departure from the statute's plain language is quite
clear in this case; though it was Rockford Memorial that placed
Sassali's condition at issue in the proceedings, Sassali likely introduced
her condition, or aspects of the services received, as an element of her
defense. 25 9 Thus, under the plain language "introduction" standard,

disclosure may have been appropriate. 26

These decisions illustrate that in contrast to the plain language of the
statute, the "at issue" standard imposes on the proponent of disclosure a
greater burden of showing how and why the recipient's mental health
came into a proceeding. The Goldberg v. Davis and Laurent v. Brelji
256. Id. at 1040 (citing to Tylitzki and Webb, both of which set forth the "affirmative" element
of the "at issue" standard, to conclude that the plaintiff did not introduce his condition into the
proceeding); see also supra note 131 (citing to cases that discuss D.C. v. S.A. but decline to
follow its reasoning).
257. Sassali v. Rockford Mem'l Hosp., 693 N.E.2d 1287, 1289 (11. App. Ct. 1998). In
Sassali, the plaintiff-recipient brought suit alleging that "the trial court erred in finding that the
[MHDDCA] authorized defendants . . . to release plaintiff's mental health records to a court
expert." Id. at 1289. The suit was initiated following an involuntary commitment proceeding
whereby Rockford hospital released the plaintiff-recipient's medical records to the physician
charged with reviewing her commitment. Id.
258. Id. at 1289-90. The court further reasoned that "even if [the] plaintiff had introduced her
mental condition as a claim or defense, Rockford ha[d] presented no evidence to show that the
trial court made the numerous and explicit findings that section 10(a)(1) requires." Id. at 1290.
259. The Sassali decision is unclear with respect to the extent to which the plaintiff had
introduced her condition as the court dismisses the possibility of disclosure because the plaintiffrecipient did not put her condition at issue. Id. at 1289-90. Nonetheless, the language of the
decision suggests that Sassali may have introduced her condition in responding to the involuntary
commitment proceedings. See id. (noting disagreement with defendant's contention that Sassali
put her condition at issue by responding to the commitment proceedings, but only on the basis
that it was not an affirmative placement of her condition).
260. See, e.g., the rationale from Laurent wherein the court allowed disclosure on the basis
that the facts and issues directly related to the recipient and the recipient's hospitalization and the
parties in such a situation "would necessarily know the identity of the witness and the fact of his
mental treatment." Laurent v. Brelji, 392 N.E.2d 929, 932 (I11.App. Ct. 1979); see also supra
notes 231-37 and accompanying text (delineating definitions of "introduction").
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decisions support this view that the "at issue" standard is much more
strenuous than the "introduction" standard. In Goldberg, under the "at
issue" standard, the plaintiff's allegations of sexual misconduct may not
have been sufficient to merit disclosure because the plaintiff did not

place her condition "affirmatively at issue" or make any claim for
mental suffering. 26 1 Moreover, the patient-recipient's extensive mental
health history was only introduced through the defendant's defense, a

factor that under the "at issue" test can preclude the admission of
protected records. 262 Similarly, in Laurent, the court concluded that
even though recipient L.S. was not a party to the litigation, as a
complaining witness he sufficiently introduced aspects of his services,

and because disclosure was not for the purposes of "ostensibl[y] . . .
questioning [L.S.'s] perceptive capabilities," disclosure was
263

warranted.
The Goldberg and Laurent courts' application of the statutory
language suggests that the decisions aligned with the language of the
statute because they relied on the need to only "introduce," in

congruence with the plain and ordinary meaning of the term, 264 aspects
of the services received by the recipient. 26 5 Particularly given that the
numerous enumerated exceptions in the MHDDCA demonstrate that the
privilege is not absolute, 26 6 a literal construction of the first prong of

section 10(a)(1) would not eviscerate the MHDDCA nor negate the
261. See supra notes 180-88 and accompanying text (discussing the Goldberg decision).
262. For examples of cases in which disclosure was precluded in part because it was the nonrecipient that sought disclosure, see Reda v. Advocate Health Care, 765 N.E.2d 1002, 1009 (I11.
2002) ("[1]t is not enough that defendants, under their theory of the case, placed [the recipient's]
mental condition at issue."); D.C., 687 N.E.2d at 1039 ("[1]t was the defendants who actually
raised the issue of plaintiffs negligence in this case."); Chi. Hous. Auth. v. Human Rights
Comm'n, 759 N.E.2d 37, 50 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) ("CHA [defendant], as the party seeking to
introduce this evidence, bore the burden of establishing its relevance."); People v. Gemeny, 731
N.E.2d 844, 851 (I. App. Ct. 2000) ("[I]nsofar as defendant's mental condition or any aspect of
his services was placed in issue, it was the State that did so."); Mandziara v. Canulli, 701 N.E.2d
127, 133 (I11.App. Ct. 1998) (precluding disclosure in part because "Mandziara did not introduce
the issue of her mental health. Her husband, though his lawyer, did"); Sassali, 693 N.E.2d at
1290 ("[Plaintiff did not place her mental condition at issue. Rather, by filing the petition for
involuntary admission, the State placed plaintiffs mental condition at issue.").
263. Laurent, 392 N.E.2d at 932-33.
264. See supra Part IV.A.2 (discussing the general meaning of "introduce into evidence").
265. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. I10/10(a)(1) (2008).
266. Goldberg v. Davis, 602 N.E.2d 812, 817 (I11. 1992); see also supra note 97 and
accompanying text (citing to cases that acknowledge that the MHDDCA privilege is not
absolute). Though the term "absolute" suggests that the privilege would require a complete bar to
communications, in the scope of evidentiary privileges "absolute" "means that if the privilege
applies and there is no applicable exception to its scope, the opposing party cannot defeat the
privilege by an ad hoc, case-specific showing of need for the privileged information." THE NEW
WIGMORE, supra note 1, at 139-40.
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purpose and spirit behind the MHDDCA. Indeed, as noted in Part III,
the provisions of the modem MHDDCA suggest the legislature intended

to expand the scope of the waiver of confidentiality, 267 not create a
"formidable challenge" to all proponents of disclosure. 26 8 This intent is

especially true in light of the remaining provisions of section 10(a)(1),
which provide for additional evidentiary protections against
unwarranted disclosure. 26 9 The Illinois courts, however, have not
reached these provisions, and as a result, the existing precedent departs
270
from the MHDDCA's plain language.
B.

ProtectionsBeyond the FirstProng: Undue Prejudice,Relevancy,
and Inflammatory Effect

271

As discussed in the preceding sections, the Illinois courts' notion of
the MHDDCA's purpose has led to a departure from the MHDDCA's
plain language. 2 72 Such a departure is unnecessary because section
10(a)(1) provides for evidentiary protections against unjustifiable

267. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text (noting the Laurent court's recognition
that the language of the MHDDCA expanded the scope of the 10(a)(1) test for admissibility and
discussing the Commission's report wherein several other exceptions for disclosure were added to
the confidentiality laws).
268. See supra note 91 and accompanying text (citing cases that describe the language of the
MHDDCA as creating a "formidable challenge" to disclosure).
269. See supra Parts III.A.3, B.2 (discussing the second and third prongs of the 10(a)(1) test
for admission and the Illinois courts treatment of those provisions).
270. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (citing to cases that apply the "at issue"
standard); see also supra Part IV.A.3 (suggesting how cases, e.g., Norskog, D.C., and Sassali,

may have turned out differently under the "introduction" standard).
271. Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs the exclusion of relevant evidence on
the basis of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. FED. R. EVID. 403. Though the rule does not
apply to Illinois state proceedings, a discussion of Rule 403 is instructive as to the application of
the rule in Illinois, particularly because Illinois does not have a specific evidentiary rule on point
but through common law utilizes the same principles. See infra notes 275-77 and accompanying
text (discussing the equivalent of the Rule 403 standard in Illinois). Rule 403 provides that:
"[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
As the Advisory Committee notes indicate, Rule 403 seeks to "balance[] the probative value of
and need for evidence against the harm likely to result from its admission." FED. R. EVID. 403
advisory committee's note (citation omitted). Furthermore, the ACN defines "unfair prejudice"
as "an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not
necessarily, an emotional one." Id. Lastly, because the language of Rule 403 requires that the
probative value be substantially outweighed by any of the aforementioned factors, it is a rule that
favors inclusion rather than exclusion. See EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES, supra note 29, at 69
("FRE 403 is cast in language favoring admissibility .... Apparently evidence is to be admitted
if probative worth and (for instance) the danger of unfair prejudice are in equal balance.").
272. See supra Parts IH.B, IV.A.3 (analyzing Illinois courts' application of the "at issue" vs.
"introduction" standards).
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disclosure. 2 73 However, because the majority of decisions pertaining to
the MHDDCA do not discuss these protections, 274 it is necessary to
briefly highlight the pertinent provisions of both discovery and
relevancy. As the Illinois Supreme Court has recognized, Illinois
common law allows a trial court to exclude evidence where its unfair
27 5
prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value.
Another factor that the court is allowed to consider under section
10(a)(1) is the record's relevancy, 2 76 and during discovery, "relevant"
evidence need only be able to lead to evidence that may be admissible at
trial.27 7 Thus, within the context of mental health records and the
MHDDCA, even if the records in the cases cited 2 78 were allowed to

pass through the first prong of section 10(a)(1), relevancy, undue
prejudice, or inflammatory effect principles may still serve to block

disclosure used solely for improper purposes. Nonetheless, in not
reaching the second and third prongs of section 10(a)(1), the courts have
not utilized the protections afforded by these prongs-protections that
may alleviate the courts' discomfort with disclosure of mental health
records.

27 9

273. See 740 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 110/10 (2008) (allowing for disclosure of records and
communications "if and only to the extent" that they are found "relevant, probative, not unduly
prejudicial or inflammatory, and otherwise clearly admissible"); see also supra Part IH.A.2
(discussing sections of and definitions under the MHDDCA).
274. See supra Part mH.B.2 (noting the paucity of decisions that discuss in depth the
application of the second and third prongs of the 10(a)(1) test).
275. Illinois does not have a general statutory codification of evidentiary rules, and
accordingly, evidentiary admissibility is predicated on common law. People v. Walker, 812
N.E.2d 339, 350-51 (IlI. 2004) (citation omitted). The court in Walker went on to hold that, in
agreement with the United States Supreme Court's Old Chief decision, "the proper consideration
is whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice." Id. at 351. The court further noted that though Illinois does not have an equivalent to
Federal Rule of Evidence 403, the courts have "always provided for" the exclusion of evidence
based on its unduly prejudicial nature. Id. at 350-51.
276. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/10(a)(1) (2008).
277. "For purposes of discovery, material is relevant if it is admissible at trial or can lead to
matters which will be admissible at trial." 4 RICHARD A. MICHAEL, ILLINOIS PRACTICE: CIVIL
PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL § 34.2, at 158 (1989) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The
Federal Rules of Evidence provides for a similar standard: evidence is relevant if it "ha[s] any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable ... than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401; see also
[E]ach
EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES, supra note 29, at 85 ("[Rlelevancy is not sufficiency ....
item need only increase the probability that some consequential point is true.").
278. See supra Part II.B.1 (citing to the myriad cases that apply and interpret the
MHDDCA's 10(a)(1) provisions).
279. See supra note 214 and accompanying text (discussing Illinois courts' discomfort with
disclosure under the MHDDCA).
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V. PROPOSAL

In contrast to the MHDDCA's plain language, the Illinois courts have
predominantly determined that in order for protected mental health
records to fall under the section 10(a)(1) exception, the recipient must
"affirmatively" place his or her condition "at issue" in the
proceeding. 280 This, however, goes beyond section 10(a)(1)'s plain
language, and does not account for the philosophical principles behind
evidentiary privileges or the need to avoid expansive constructions of
truth-inhibiting privileges. 2 8 1 As the psychotherapist-patient privilege
is a relatively recent addition to privilege law, 28 2 this Part first
underscores the need to address the MHDDCA's philosophical-legal
foundation in order to properly interpret its provisions. 28 3 This Part
then suggests that the Illinois courts return to an interpretation based on
the statute's plain language by revisiting doctrines of statutory
construction. 28 4 This Part then underscores the need to acknowledge
the additional two prongs of the section 10(a)(1) test for
admissibility. 2 85 Lastly, this Part describes the arguments cited by
proponents of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, in an effort to
remind the reader and the courts of the sensitivity and conscientiousness
that must28 be utilized when determining admissibility under section
10(a)(1). 1
A.

PrivilegesAre Not Absolute

The distinction between the "at issue" and "introduction" standards in
the Illinois courts becomes one of critical importance because of the
courts' use of the latter in favor of a broad application of the
280. See supra Part III.B.l.a (discussing cases, e.g., Norskog, that apply the "at issue"
standard of admissibility).
281. See supra Part ll.A (discussing various legal-philosophical underpinnings and the history
of evidentiary privileges).
282. Paul W. Mosher, Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege: The History and Significance of the
United States Supreme Court's Decision in the Case of Jaffee v. Redmond, in CONFIDENTIAL
RELATIONSHIPS: PSYCHOANALYTIC, ETHiCAL AND LEGAL CONTEXTS 195 (Christine M. Koggel,

et al., ed. 2003) ("[U]nlike other well-known privileges ... the psychotherapist-patient privilege
is of relatively recent origin .... ").
283. See infra Part V.A (discussing additional philosophical underpinnings of evidentiary
privileges in the context of re-interpreting the MHDDCA).
284. See infra Part V.B (suggesting that the Illinois courts reassess their interpretation of
section 10(a)(1) in light of traditional doctrines of statutory construction).
285. See infra Part V.C (underscoring the need to rely more heavily on the second and third
prongs of section 10(a)(1)).
286. See infra Part V.D (noting the arguments in support of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege so as to highlight the need to maintain congruence with these principles while
simultaneously re-interpreting section 10(a)(1 )).
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privilege. 28 7 In fact, because the decisions cited in this Comment justify
28 8
this expansive construction through the social value of the privilege,
it is important to highlight the criticism of this privilege 28 9 to emphasize
the need to maintain congruence with the MHDDCA's express
language. The need to evaluate these criticisms is compounded by the
fact that where a court goes behind a statute's plain language in order to
determine the proper interpretation, it must consider both the law's
objectives and the "evils sought to be remedied. 2 9 °

Specific to privileges in the medical context, scholars have wondered
whether the sanctity afforded to communications between the physician
and patient are a per se result of recognizing a privilege. 29 1 In his Jaffee
dissent, Justice Scalia questioned the value of the psychotherapistpatient privilege, noting that the likely deterrent effect from rejecting
the privilege is minimal particularly considering the fact that few people
anticipate litigation when they seek therapy, and psychotherapy itself
2 92
was "thriving" prior to recognizing the privilege.
This is not to say that such privileges are codified for invalid reasons,
but rather to question the broad application of such privileges that
occurs without evaluating the pragmatic, underlying effects and

purposes. 293 This questioning is particularly important in a situation
287. See supra Part III.B.l.a (citing to cases that decide admissibility under the "at issue"
standard).
288. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (discussing Illinois courts' reliance on the
perceived legislative intent when interpreting and applying the MHDDCA and section 10(a)(l)).
289. See infra notes 291-92 and accompanying text (discussing specific criticism of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege).
290. See People ex rel. Birkett v. Dockery, 919 N.E.2d 311, 315 (111.2009) (noting that when
engaging in statutory construction, "[the court] may also consider the . . . evils sought to be
remedied"); People v. Morris, 848 N.E.2d 1000, 1006 (iIl. 2006) ("It is a well established rule of
statutory construction that, in determining the intent of the legislature, a court 'may properly
consider not only the language of the statute, but also the reason and necessity for the law [and]
the evils sought to be remedied."') (citation omitted).
291. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 29, at 340. Additional theories have proposed
that there is an "alternative basis" for these privileges predicated on the need "to protect the
essential privacy of certain significant human relationships." Id. (citation omitted). This is in
part because it can be difficult to accurately observe the "beneficial consequences claimed for
privilege" and many scholars have questioned whether such consequences are in fact materialized
outside the scope of the respective litigation at issue. Id. at 352; see also Jaffee v. Redmond, 518
U.S. 1, 22 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (inquiring as to the extent to which recognition of the
privilege will reduce the deterrent "from seeking psychological counseling ... because of fear of
later disclosure in litigation").
292. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 24 (Scalia, L, dissenting).
293. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 29, at 353 ("[W]hile there is no doubt that some
of the statutorily created privileges are soundly based, legislatures have on occasion been unduly
influenced by powerful groups seeking the prestige and convenience of a professionally based
privilege."). Indeed, "[r]ecently, confidentiality has suffered a number of defeats in clashes with
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like the Illinois courts' variable interpretations of section 10(a)(1). If
the privilege exists solely to facilitate the psychotherapist-patient
relationship and to sanctify any communications made in such a
context, the "at issue" standard might be justifiable so long as the
statutory language provides for such a standard.29 4
If, however, the purpose is to remedy the "evil ' 2 95 of unnecessary
intrusion into personal admissions vulnerable to stigmatization or
prejudice, then the privilege must be understood in that context. 29 6 It
appears that the Illinois courts have implicitly adopted the formerthe
as opposed
to recognizing
"at
issue"
emphasizing
comprehensiveness of the "introduction" standard and the second and
third prongs of section 10(a)(1). 29 7 The totality of section 10(a)(1)'s
language, however, reflects a sophisticated combination of these two
prevailing purposes by recognizing that some of the primary deterrents
to disclosure are prejudice and inflammatory effect, while
simultaneously restricting disclosure to situations where the recipient
triggers the exception. 29 8 But the Illinois courts' utilization of the "at

other values." Privileges and Professionals,supra note 47, at 598. Saltzburg cites to various
Supreme Court decisions in which common law privileges, such as the spousal privilege, have
been "contracted." Id. at n.4 (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980); United States
v. Mendoza, 574 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir. 1978); Ryan v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 568 F.2d 531
(7th Cir. 1977)).
294. See, e.g., Privilegesand Professionals,supra note 47, at 602 ("[P]rivileges should extend
no further than the underlying policies require.").
295. See supra note 290 and accompanying text (citing to Illinois Supreme Court decisions
that acknowledge the courts' obligation to look to the evil a statute seeks to remedy when
engaging in statutory construction).
296. See supra note 290 and accompanying text (discussing Illinois cases noting that
legislative enactments need to be understood in the context of the evils sought to be remedied by
such statututes); see also supra notes 68-72 (discussing the Jaffee Court's rationale for
recognizing the psychotherapist-patient privilege).
297. See supra Part III.B.2 (noting a dearth of decisions that analyze admissibility under
10(a)(1) with respect to the second and third prongs required before admission is proper).
298. See Mandziara v. Canulli, 701 N.E.2d 127, 133 (II. App. Ct. 1998) ("Section 10(a)(l)
presents a sophisticated balancing test ... ");see also supra Parts lI.A.3, B.2 (citing to and
discussing the requirements of the second and third prongs of the 10(a)(1) test for admissibility).
This is further demonstrated by the fact that the confidentiality provision proposed by the thenGovernor's commission did not provide for this sophisticated balancing test, but rather allowed
the court to limit disclosure only "to the extent that other admissible evidence is sufficient to
establish the facts in issue." COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 89, at 170. Though this language
is also in section 10 of the MHDDCA, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT 110/10(b) (2008), by incorporating
the three-pronged test into section 10(a)(1), the legislature clearly intended to create the
sophisticated balancing test. See, e.g., People ex rel. Birkett v. Dockery, 919 N.E.2d 311, 315
(Il. 2009) ("[The language of the statute is the best indication of th[e legislative] intent.");
Lukwinski v. Stone Container Corp., 726 N.E.2d 665, 670 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (noting that the
first place to look for legislative intent is to "consider the specific wording of the legislation").
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issue" standard does not reflect this combination, 2and
99 accordingly,
language.
plain
legislative
the
to
effect
full
give
cannot
B. Return to the Doctrines of Statutory Construction
Consequent to the Illinois courts' departure from section 10(a)(1)'s
plain language, 30 0 and in light of the continued criticism of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege, 30 1 the Illinois courts should revisit
their interpretations of section 10(a)(1) by using the established
Doctrines of statutory
doctrines for statutory construction. 30 2
construction guide the way in which a court construes statutes and
require the courts to do, among others, three primary things. 30 3 First,
the doctrines require a court to first look at a statute's plain language in
order to deduce the legislative intent. 304 Only if the plain language is
ambiguous may the court then determine the legislative intent by
looking to the legislative history, the purposes behind the statute, and
the "evils sought to be remedied. ' 30 5 Even if the plain language is
ambiguous and the court must go beyond the language to deduce its

meaning, the court must not read into the statute additional limitations
or conditions and must not apply the statute to maintain only the court's
30 6
perception of proper public policy.

299. See supra notes 271-79 (noting Illinois court's limited discussions of the second and
third prongs of 10(a)(1)).
300. See supra Part 1V.A.3 (analyzing the Illinois courts' departure from the plain language of
the MHDDCA).
301. See supra Part V.A (discussing criticisms of the psychotherapist-patient privilege and the
need to look at the underlying purpose of the privilege in order to interpret the legislative intent
from the statute's plain language).
302. See infra notes 303-10 and accompanying text (discussing rules of statutory
construction).
303. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (noting the requirement that courts interpret and
apply statutes according to the doctrines of statutory construction).
304. People ex rel. Birkett, 919 N.E.2d at 315 ("[ln all cases of statutory construction, our
goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature, and the language of the statute is
the best indication of that intent.") (citation omitted); Quigg v. Walgreen Co., 905 N.E.2d 293,
298 (111.App. Ct. 2009) (citing Ultsch v. ill. Mun. Retirement Fund, 874 N.E.2d 1 (ill. 2007))
("[T]he best evidence of the legislature's intent is the statutory language, which must be given its
plain and ordinary meaning.").
305. People ex rel. Birkett, 919 N.E.2d at 315 (finding that the court "may also consider the
purposes behind the statute and the evils sought to be remedied"); see also Cinkus v. Vill. of
Stickney Mun. Officers Electoral Bd., 886 N.E.2d 1011, 1022 (111.2008) ("Where the meaning of
a statute is ambiguous, courts may look beyond the statutory language and consider the purpose
of the law and the evils it was intended to remedy."); County of DuPage v. ILRB, 900 N.E.2d
1095, 1101 (Ill.
2008) ("In addition to the statutory language, the court may consider the purpose
behind the law and the evils sought to be remedied.").
306. See Reda v. Advocate Health Care, 765 N.E.2d 1002, 1010 (111. 2002) ("[I]n interpreting
a statute, it is never proper for a court to . . . read[] into a statute exceptions, limitations, or
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Applying this principle to the MHDDCA, section 10(a)(1) clearly
sets forth a standard for admissibility based on an "introduction" of

one's condition or aspect of the services rather than on the affirmative
placement of the condition into the center of the controversy of the
action. 30 7 Thus, if the Illinois courts seek to interpret the legislative

intent, they must do so based on section 10(a)(1)'s plain language,
which suggests an intent to avoid inflammatory or unduly prejudicial
disclosure, 30 8 and a broader definition of "introduction" than that seen
in previous statutes. 30 9 This is particularly true given the United States
Supreme Court's indication that where a statutory term lacks a specific

definition, the court must interpret the term using its "ordinary or
natural meaning." 310 As the preceding demonstrates, the "ordinary" or

"natural" meaning of "introduction" means merely to put forth, not that
3 11

it must be an affirmative, express, or direct placement "at issue."
Accordingly, adding the "at issue," "affirmative," or "formidable
challenge" 3 12 requirements goes beyond section 10(a)(1)'s language,
and where it does so at the cost of the truth-seeking function, the courts
should reassess this definition. 3 13 Moreover, courts must interpret
conditions which conflict with the clearly expressed legislative intent."); Murphy v. Mancari's
Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 887 N.E.2d 569, 575 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (citing Barthel v. Ill. Cent.
Gulf R.R. Co., 384 N.E.2d 323, 327 (Ill. 1978)) ("[Clourts will read nothing into such statutes by
intendment or implication."). The Murphy court further noted that it "would not extend such
statutes 'any further than what the language of the statute absolutely require[d] by its express
terms or by clear implication."' 887 N.E.2d at 575 (citation omitted). This was particularly true
given that the statute at issue in Murphy was "in derogation of the common law," and as a result,
the Murphy court noted the obligation of the courts to limit such statutes to their express
language. Id. (citation omitted).
307. See supra Parts [V.A.1-3 (discussing the plain language-congruent application of section
10(a)(1)).
308. See supra Parts IH.A.1-3, B.2 (discussing the history of promulgation and the sections of
the MHDDCA that enumerate the need to avoid disclosure that is unduly prejudicial or
inflammatory).
309. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (citing to the Laurent court's
acknowledgement that the MHDDCA was actually an expansion of previous statutes governing
the admissibility of mental health records).
310. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994) ("In the absence of such a definition [of the
term at issue], we construe a statutory term in accordance with its ordinary or natural meaning.")
(citation omitted); see also Lukwinski v. Stone Container Corp., 726 N.E,2d 665, 671 (111.App.
Ct. 2000) (citing Gem Elecs. of Monmouth, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 702 N.E.2d 529, 532 (Il.
1998)) ("[U]nless otherwise defined, statutory terms are to be ascribed their ordinary and
popularly understood meanings.").
311. See supra note 232 and accompanying text (citing to the Black's Law Dictionary
definitions for "introduce into evidence").
312. See supra note 91 and accompanying text (citing cases that describe obtaining admission
under section 10(a)(I) as a "formidable challenge").
313. See supra note 306 and accompanying text (citing to Illinois cases recognizing that it is
not the role of the courts to read into statutes any limitations or conditions that go beyond the
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statutes to give effect to each clause 3 14 and allow all clauses to be
operative. 3 15 But the "at issue" standard does not allow for the second

and third prongs of section 10(a)(1) to have effect because it
preemptively prohibits the court from reaching those prongs. 3 16 As a

result, the "at issue" standard not only departs from section 10(a)(1)'s
3 17

plain language, but also does not give effect to each prong.
Especially because section 10(a)(1) defines basic relevancy to only
include "the fact of treatment, the cost of services, and the ultimate
diagnosis," 3 18 expansively construing section 10(a)(1)'s language to
include "at issue" is unnecessary to effectuate the purpose behind the
psychotherapist-patient privilege: to induce persons to seek such
prejudicial, inflammatory, or
treatment 3 19 and to prohibit the unduly 320
stigmatizing use of mental health records.
C. The Need to Reach the Second and Third Prongs of Section
1O(a)(1)
Similarly, the courts should increase their reliance on the second and

third prongs of section 10(a)(1) so as to incorporate the section's
comprehensive tests and protections. 32 1 These provisions would
preclude the disclosure of mental health records sought to be used solely

for inflammatory or unduly prejudicial purposes. 322 Moreover, the in
camera inspection procedure provided for in section 10(a)(1)
specifically exists to maintain the confidentiality of mental health

scope of the enumerated language).
314. See Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 106 (1993) (citing Moskal v. United States, 498
U.S. 103, 109-10 (1990)) ("Our reading of the Kansas Act is the only one that gives effect 'to
every clause and word of [the] statute."').
315. See Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 249 (1985)
(citing Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 (1979)) (noting that it is an "elementary canon of
construction that a statute should be interpreted so as not to render one part inoperative").
316. See supra notes 271-79 (discussing Illinois courts' limited utilization of the second and
third prongs of the 10(a)(1) test).
317. See supra Part IH.A.3 (describing the three prongs of section 10(a)(1).
318. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/10(a)(1) (2008). A party can overcome this basic restriction
on relevancy by showing a "compelling need" for the production of additional records. Id.
319. See House v. SwedishAmerican Hosp., 564 N.E.2d 922, 926 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) ("[T]his
general prohibition against disclosure of [mental health] information was enacted to ...provide[]
an inducement to seek such treatment.") (citation omitted).
320. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text (summarizing the requirements of the
third prong of section 10(a)(1 )).
321. See supra Part M.A.3 (discussing sophisticated balancing text of the second and third
prongs).
322. See supra notes 275-77 and accompanying text (discussing the rules of evidentiary
admissibility as they apply in Illinois).
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records, 3 23 and as a result, should be relied upon as a screening
mechanism for the propriety of admission. This is particularly true
where the United States Supreme Court has noted that, because in
camera reviews are a "smaller intrusion upon the confidentiality" of a

confidential communication, proponents of admission need only, at the
outset, meet a smaller evidentiary burden than that required
to
324
eventually meet the admission of privileged communications.
As demonstrated in the preceding sections, some of the most highly
contested decisions arising out of interpretations of section 10(a)(1) did
not analyze the evidentiary admissibility under the second and third
prongs, 3 25 an approach strongly criticized by appellate courts. 32 6 By

utilizing section 10(a)(1)'s numerous provisions, however, the courts
can remain cognizant of the underlying nature of the evidentiary
privilege while granting deference to the-presumably intentional32 7
three-pronged test for admissibility.
D. Arguments in Support of the Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege
Though this Comment asserts that the Illinois courts must alter the
way in which they have interpreted and applied the MHDDCA and
section 10(a)(1), this is not to say that the courts should neglect to
consider the compelling arguments in support of the psychotherapistpatient privilege. Indeed, it is these arguments that, though in large part

323. Goldberg v. Davis, 602 N.E.2d 812, 819 (Ill. 1992) (citing Novak v. Rathnam, 478
N.E.2d 1334, 1336 (Il1. 1985)).
324. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 572 (1989) ("[A] lesser evidentiary showing is
needed to trigger in camera review than is required ultimately to overcome the privilege.")
(citation omitted).
325. See supra Parts I1I.B.2, IV.B (noting the limited discussion in the courts of the proper
application of the second and third prongs of the 10(a)(1) test).
326. See Kyoung Suk Kim v. St. Elizabeth's Hosp. et al., 918 N.E.2d 256, 264 (Ill. App. Ct.
2009) (reversing the dismissal of plaintiff Kim's claims under the MHDDCA and remanding
specifically because "the record does not indicate ... that the circuit court considered ... the
[second and third prong] findings required by section 10(a)(1)"); Chi. Hous. Auth. v. Human
Rights Comm'n, 759 N.E.2d 37, 51 (111. App. Ct. 2001) ("[S]ection [10(a)(1)] requires that before
disclosure, the ALJ must first make several findings concerning the records' relevancy, probative
value, undue prejudice, inflammatory content[,] and general admissibility."); Mandziara v.
Canulli, 701 N.E.2d 127, 133 (111.App. Ct. 1998) (criticizing the lower court because it "never
considered admissibility nor did it weigh Mandziara's privacy interests with the 'interests of
substantial justice'); Sassali v. Rockford Mem'l Hosp., 693 N.E.2d 1287, 1290 (111.App. Ct.
1998) ("[E]ven if plaintiff had introduced her mental condition as a claim or defense, Rockford
has presented no evidence to show that the trial court made the numerous and explicit findings
that section 10(a)(1) requires.").
327. See supra Parts I.A.2-3 (discussing various provisions of the MHDDCA and section
10(a)(1)).
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may result in the Illinois courts' broad application of the privilege, can
nonetheless guide the courts through the difficult balancing test.
Proponents of the psychotherapist-patient privilege generally cite to
three prevailing principles in support of the privilege: (1) that

confidentiality is a "sine qua non" for a healthy therapeutic
relationship; 3 29 (2) that the evidentiary benefit or probative value of
disclosure is likely to be minimal;3 30 and (3) that fear of a
confidentiality breach deters potential recipients from seeking the
necessary treatment. 33 1 When applying section 10(a)(1), it is of the

utmost importance

that courts maintain congruence

with these

principles.
But congruency need not equal a departure from the
statute's plain language, and where section 10(a)(1) expressly allows for
precautionary analyses to smoke out improper uses of mental health
information, following the plain language of the first prong of section
10(a)(1) will allow the courts to uphold the poignant rationale behind
the privilege.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Illinois legislature has deemed the unique nature of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege and the confidentiality of such

communications important enough to protect with an evidentiary
privilege. The application of section 10(a)(1)'s exception to the
privilege has varied considerably depending on whether the courts apply
the plain language "introduction" standard as opposed to the "at issue"

328. See supra notes 67-72 (citing to the Jaffee court's rationale for recognizing the
psychotherapist-patient privilege and the Illinois courts relying on the Jaffee rationale).
329. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 21, Jaffee v.
Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) (No. 95-266); Brief of the Am. Psychiatric Ass'n et al. as Amici
Curiae In Support of Respondents at 16, Jaffee, 518 U.S. I (No. 95-266) ("The very essence of
psychotherapy is confidential personal revelations about matters which the patient is and should
be normally reluctant to discuss.").
330. Brief for the United States, supra note 329, at 23 (arguing that in certain instances, "the
failure to recognize the privilege would not materially assist the fact-finding function of the
courts"); Brief for the Am. Psychiatric Ass'n et al., supra note 329, at 21-22 ("[T]he evidentiary
benefits of breaching therapeutic privacy will very often be weak.").
331.
Brief for the United States, supra note 329, at 22 ("Uncertainty about whether
disclosures will remain confidential may therefore have a substantive effect on the willingness of
individuals to seek psychotherapeutic treatment."); Brief for the Am. Psychiatric Ass'n et al.,
supra note 329, at 18 ("The predictable result of rejecting a privilege, then, would be not only to
breach one of the important remaining spheres of personal privacy, but also to inflict
transformative injury on the psychotherapeutic relationship and hence on mental-health care.").
332. See supra note 305 and accompanying text (discussing interpretive canon that where a
court finds a statutory term ambiguous, it may look to the evil sought to be remedied by the
statute).
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standard, two standards with nuanced and cognizable distinctions
resulting in broadly different results. Though the latter is most
prevalent, its departure from section 10(a)(1)'s plain language requires
the courts to reconsider this interpretation particularly because it has
precluded disclosure in instances in which the statute's plain language
might allow for disclosure.
With the protections afforded by the second and third prongs of
section 10(a)(1), recipients and the courts interpreting their rights need
not be concerned that irrelevant, unduly prejudicial information will be
disclosed only to prejudice the recipient of services. The sophisticated
three-pronged balancing test for admissibility specifically allows the
courts to foreclose disclosure in such instances. As a result, the Illinois
courts should reassess their interpretation of section 10(a)(1) in the light
most congruent with traditional doctrines of statutory construction,
while relying on the evidentiary protections provided by the latter two
prongs. Doing so will allow the courts to effectuate the meaningful
purpose behind the privilege while encouraging a conscientious truthseeking process-the most effective way to maintain compliance with
the legislative intent while facilitating the search for the truth.

